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New Republic

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THE COAL CRISIS CALLS FOR A NATIONAL POLICY

AN EDITORIAL

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

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New Republic

CONTENTS FOR NOV. 28, 1949

5 The Need for a National Coal Policy: An Editorial
7 The Week:
7 The Economic Trend
7 Empty Chairs
8 No Retreat on FEPC
8 Herblock Cartoon
9 Time for Tea
9 Outside America
11 The Brannan Plan by A. G. Mezerik
13 The Dilemma of Liberal Catholics by Percy Winner
17 Harold L. Ickes
18 Fall Book Section:
RUSSIA
18 Foreign Policy
19 Stalin
21 Yalta
23 Eastern Diplomacy
24 Natural Economy
26 Literature
27 Government
CRITICS AND WRITERS
28 Contemporary Scholarship
32 Preoccupations of Fiction
35 Mrs. Trollope in America
36 Hogben's History
36 Music
38 Movies

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WASHINGTON WIRE

THANKSGIVING means turkey and fallen leaves and football in the Capital, and sounds relaxing. Congress is away, the President is leaving for three weeks. The White House is being rebuilt and is just a shell; in House and Senate statuary statesmen are wrapped in sailcloth like mummies while new ceilings go in. It sounds quiet. It isn't.

The fact is a new wind is blowing in foreign affairs involving Germany. It looks as though we were going to be pals again with the Germans before long. Anyone who reads this column knows that under our gruff, cynical exterior beats an 18-carat heart. We love fairy stories, sweet young things and romance. But the new German state which the State Department seems intent on introducing soon to polite society like a blushing debutante gives us an odd feeling in the pit of the stomach. Somebody once remarked that Pegler was the only man who could make him feel seasick on dry land. That's the feeling we mean.

In order to solve the Russian problem it is felt necessary to revive the German problem. Everyone who has covered Pentagon conferences has heard generals comment wistfully at one time or another on how nice it would be to have a German army around again. It would do two things, see: cut US occupation costs; help hold back Russia. Between the time Secretary Acheson left on November 7 for Paris and Bonn and his return on November 14, a far-reaching policy change had been indicated. It is an echo of that atomic-bomb explosion in Russia.

Dean Acheson and President Truman separately denied last week that Western Germany is being rearmed. The State Department appears to feel that it is wrong even to talk about it while efforts continue to bring France and Germany together. Crucial conversations in that direction are going on in Europe. But Acheson took the symbolic step of visiting Bonn in person; little by little the trappings of German sovereignty are being restored, consular services are now permitted, factory-demolition is checked and there's talk of stronger "police" forces.

Secretary Acheson's trip was part of the process of reintroducing Germany to polite society. We guess it won't be long now. And when the sweet young thing finally trips forward to make her bow, we bet she has a .45 concealed somewhere under her ruffles.

Du Pont President Greenewalt testified before the anti-monopoly committee last week. It is Greenewalt's complaint that nobody loves a giant. We found him a self-righteous figure. He says the fact that a couple of giants control a whole industry is nothing to worry about. Monopoly is bad, but "oligopoly" (control by a few) is okay. This is news to the Federal Trade Commission. Its latest study shows growing concentration in 26 selected US manufacturing industries. In each big industry covered, one-third of the total assets are now controlled by six corporations or fewer; in half of them, four or fewer companies control 70 percent, and in 14 of the 26, three or fewer companies control 60 percent of the net capital assets.

Another important hearing continues here—able Senator Douglas' investigation of the bases of our economic stability. It sounds dull and the other day we counted only two people in the public seats. But there were 24 reporters. Boiling it down, the fact seems to be that we've come over to the inflationary side again and have to start worrying about that now, for a change. Don't worry too hard just yet, but the facts are there. The chief factor

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is the unwillingness of Congress and taxpayers to meet their bills. This year's Treasury deficit should be $6 billion or more; we have a $256 billion national debt. Taxpayers want security against Russia but are unwilling to meet the cost. That means deficits. Deficits mean inflation.

We have always wanted to meet somebody who had divorced his wife because she had the bad taste to produce only female heirs, so we followed the Shah of Iran around with interest. He is a well-built young man with a competent American press agent who said all the proper things at the right time. The Shah was welcomed by Truman, made honorary captain of the George Washington University football team, and then left for a visit to New York.

This business of achieving sex equality is fascinating. The other day at a cocktail party we had a conversation with the husband of the new US Ambassador to Denmark. Truman, you recall, picked Mrs. Eugenie Anderson, of Red Wing, Minnesota, to be our diplomatic representative at Copenhagen. John P. Anderson, her husband, practical farmer and abstract artist, is proud of his wife and has a sense of humor. This will probably be needed. The State Department is going to give him every perquisite normally given an ambassador's wife. Trouble is with protocol. An ambassador sits at the queen's right. That doesn't seem appropriate if the ambassador is a woman, so Mrs. Anderson will sit at King Frederick's left. But where does that leave Mr. A? There isn't a protocol chief in Europe who isn't worrying himself sick over it, we understand.

Notes. We are sorry to say that David Lilienthal will probably quit soon. . . . Jimmy Roosevelt is likely to win his race for the California governorship. . . . Harold Stassen boastfully claims credit for blocking federal aid to education. . . . The biggest 1949 lobby bill filed to date is $1,225,028, by the American Medical Association.

Washington T. R. B.

CORRESPONDENCE

Atomic Peace

SIR: I appreciate the opportunity to study, and to pass on to others directly at work on the subject, your editorial, "A Proposal for Atomic Peace" (the *NR*, November 7).

We have tried to assure all mankind that our minds are open, though we adhere to the only plan that we know which contains effective and enforceable safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes. This is the humane policy, as well as our legislative policy, as declared in the Act of Congress of 1946, Section 10.

Perhaps your five concrete suggestions may assist in the continuing effort at coöperation among the nations and in determining whether there is "a better and more effective plan."

WARREN R. AUSTIN,
US Representative to the UN

New York City

Bomber Diplomacy

SIR: Your recent three editorials on US policy for Asia are quite sound and well-reasoned, but one cannot help feeling that your policy for China lacks the sense of urgency that is required to make even these reasonable ideas realistic and effective. . . .

The longer we avoid laying down a positive policy in hopes of finding some face-saving solution for having backed the wrong horse and brought so much suffering to the Chinese people, the more difficult it will be to resume constructive diplomatic relations; to speak once more, openly and proudly, of the "traditional friendship of the American and Chinese people." . . .

According to an AP dispatch from Hong Kong, November 8, the Nationalists have purchased 100 B-25 bombers here, which American civilians have been ferrying to Taiwan. After delivery, the Americans have been flown to Hong Kong "reportedly . . . aboard US military planes." How our policy-makers can permit the sale of bombing planes to the ousted Nationalists and the transport of the ferrying crews on US military planes while at the same time facing the problem of a constructive policy to the new Chinese government strains the average man's supply of common sense.

If, in reply, the new Chinese government would "conduct" American Foreign Service officers to areas of bombing during Nationalist air raids in order to help them "report to Washington," that would not strain my supply of common sense quite so much, although I have several friends there who might be endangered. Even if the Chinese lives that seemed so important to our government and people from 1937 to 1945 are not now so vital, perhaps the safety of our own personnel might arouse our so careful and devious policy-makers to the dirty business that our once-honored flag in Asia can no longer hide.

Seattle, Wash. WATSON HADLEY

Prosperity Bond Drive

SIR: In his study on full employment (the *NR*, October 24) Leon H. Keyserling is substantially correct, but has failed to consider a few important facts.

The first is that with our inadequate old pension system, the workers must save part of their earnings, reducing to that extent their purchasing power. Part of these savings is loaned to others and reappears as purchasing power; a considerable portion is dead money as reserves in banks, insurance companies and elsewhere and leaves equal value of production unpurchased. More is produced than purchased and a surplus is certain to occur eventually.

The second fact is that while the present export trade absorbs much of our production even if quite a lot is given away, many commodities used mainly in the domestic market have already attained a saturation point at present costs and prices. The industries producing these goods have no other alternative than to close their doors and create unemployment, thereby reducing the national income and the national purchasing power and bringing more industries to a halt. . . .

Whenever one or more industries in any district have reached a point of saturation and other industries are unable to absorb the released labor, that surplus labor must be absorbed immediately in national projects if full employment and full purchasing power are to be maintained. This is the only way the surplus consumer goods can be absorbed permanently. No other solution can save us from a depression.

National projects could be either public improvements, public rental housing, government-owned and financed, or any other self-liquidating project. The financing could be done by issuing prosperity bonds at low interest. As the value of such bonds will be no higher than the actual value of the improvements or projects, they would be permanently backed by real actual value. Those who want to save will only be too glad to invest in prosperity, their prosperity.

South Bound Brook, N. J. D. DE CASTRO

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VOLUME 121, NUMBER 22, ISSUE 1826, NEW YORK CITY, NOVEMBER 28, 1949 **New Republic**

THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL COAL POLICY

"THINK OF ME as a coal miner," John L. Lewis said once, "and you won't make any mistakes."

The miners have been a community apart, class-conscious, resentful, proud. They worked at low wages in company mines, bought at high prices in company stores, lived meanly in company houses "worse than swinepens," as a Senate committee found. When they protested, they were thrown by company-picked judges and sheriffs into company-chosen jails. Their only recourse was warfare. And just as the American Legion's peacetime attitudes are conditioned by its wartime experiences, so the miners' stand today is shaped by the bloodshed and class warfare of their early years.

The miners joined in unions to fight, and yet, as Saul Alinsky writes, "they struck down their own leaders again and again with the blind fury of their own bitterness." "The Mine Workers Union," Alinsky adds in his biography of Lewis, "could only be united by some man far tougher and more ruthless than all of them put together."

John Siney and John Mitchell were broken by the miners. So was Lewis' father. Lewis distrusted his own men from first to last. He took from them the power to break their leadership. He destroyed independence and opposition within the union. He proved that the union was stronger than the government of the United States. He raised the miners from the lowest to the highest place among American workers. He used his mine workers' methods to smash the barriers to the industrial unionism of the CIO.

In all industry there is a time when force alone can win recognition of the union and its standards. There should follow a time when trade unionism is accepted and standards are set by negotiation, reason and compromise. On both sides there is needed a good deal of human growth. This year, the Ford Company, which fought the "battle of the overpass" in Detroit, has concluded a pension program that ten years ago its directors would have denounced as Communist anarchy. Republic Steel, which forced the Memorial Day massacre twelve years ago, was among the first to sign the industry's far-reaching settlement with the steel workers. Uncompromising as they are, the coal operators are no worse than the Ford officials and Tom Girdler. An important difference among these three basic industries is that Reuther and Murray have grown with changing conditions and that Lewis has not.

Lewis has established standards from which all labor has gained. Without his past achievements the present gains of the steel and auto workers could not have been won. Yet Lewis has perpetuated among the trade unions his belief that democracy is intolerable in a union, that democratic government is and must be a weapon in the hands of the enemy, that progress is achieved by good contracts alone, and that a contract is a tool to be manipulated, rather than a binding commitment to be honored whether good or bad. Today these beliefs are destructive for the future development of the labor movement.

As we move toward a welfare state, planning rather than force must determine the basic distribution of national income. But to Lewis, as he explains to Alinsky, force remains the one means of settling disputes:

> When we control the production of coal we hold the vitals of our society right in our hands. I can squeeze, twist and pull until we get the inevitable victory. Whenever we strike, time is always on our side. . . .
>
> There are not huge profits in the coal industry, but there are enormous profits in steel, autos, rubber and other industries. Stop coal and you stop steel. Stop steel and you stop autos and then tires and every part of our economy. Therefore, as a strike progresses the hostility of the press and the Government begins to build up pressures against us; but on the other hand the pressures for profit in steel and autos also develop and increase. . . . We become the immovable anvil, with the operators lying on us, being hammered into surrender by the pounding blows of steel, autos and all our other industrial allies. . . .

The Taft-Hartley Act is no answer to this approach. Its provisions are aimed at every section of the labor movement, good and bad. Its injunction provisions simply delay collective bargaining while tensions increase until the period of the injunction expires. And yet the philosophy of the law is accepted as a reply to Lewis' philosophy. The injunction is superfluous in the case of most industrial unions because their leaders

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accept the primacy of reason and public opinion as expressed in the recommendations of fact-finding boards. Yet the fact-finding-board procedure, which is the present alternative to the Taft-Hartley injunction, is inapplicable in the coal dispute mainly because to Lewis its philosophy and findings have no meaning. Just as Lewis precipitated the Smith-Connally Act, today he is perpetuating Taft-Hartley.

Lewis is a great free-enterprise labor leader. Today, even in his own industry, free-enterprise principles alone cannot provide a better living for the miners.

The twenties and the thirties were lean years for the coal industry. Lewis forced wages up; the operators countered with mechanization, cutting the number of miners from 700,000 to 350,000 in 25 years. Over the protest of his own men Lewis accepted mechanization. His union was saved only by Section 7A of the NRA. In prosperity and in wartime, when the industry reached its peak of profits and production, Lewis was able to force new concessions. He raised the miners' wages from 88 cents an hour for time worked at the coal face in 1940 to $1.91 for time underground in the 1949 contract. He won a truly great achievement in the welfare fund, which has brought pensions and medical care for the first time to hundreds of mining towns.

Yet the benefits of the high hourly wages and of the welfare fund, whose income varies with the tonnage of coal mined, are realized only if the miners work full-time. This year the miners may earn an average of $2,800, or $800 less than last year.

The blame for this loss falls on Lewis. But the real reason is that the coal miners are again facing a time of retrenchment. The capacity of our mines is 750 million tons. Peak production, in 1947, was 631 million tons. Since then, the market for coal has declined. The conversion of American industry to oil has been accelerated by the fall in the price of fuel oil. The railroads, which took 110 million tons of coal in 1947, are now using about half that. Europe, which took 70 million tons of coal in 1947, will take 10 million next year. If Lewis had not shut down the mines the operators would have acted, instead, to reduce output to about 450 million tons this year.

Lewis' response to this downward turn was to propose restriction of output. He told the mine workers' convention in October, 1948:

"If we are going to starve in this industry we will all starve together. . . . If there are only three days' work in this industry we will all have three days' work."

Lewis proposed this solution to the operators at the start of negotiations. They rejected it and Lewis ordered the three-day week on his own responsibility. It violated the spirit of the contract and the spirit of the anti-trust laws. It was costly, wasteful and unjustified as a permanent solution in a nation that cannot afford four days of leisure each week.

Work, rather than wages, is the real issue for the miners. If production continues high this winter, then spring will find the mines in serious trouble. For this kind of problem, which requires the coöperation of the miners, the operators and the nation, Lewis' kind of trade unionism has no solution.

There are 8,000 operators in the coal industry. Like the farmers, they tend to increase production as prices fall. The giant mines are safe; so are the little, non-union strip mines. In the center group, many mines are already closing down. When they close, floors heave, roofs collapse, corridors flood; the coal is lost forever.

In peacetime oil may be cheap. In war oil goes to the front and the nation lives on coal. In the last war coal was available because strip mines were quickly developed. Now they are worked out. Security alone requires that capacity be kept high. So does the national interest.

For within five to 25 years, barring some miracle in atomic-power development, the demand for coal is certain to rise again as the total demand for fuel increases and the supplies of oil and gas run short.

Today 51 percent of our energy is developed from oil and gas. And yet 95 percent of our fuel reserves is in coal. But in the same blind manner in which we stripped our forests and our topsoil we are squandering our oil and gas today. To earn higher profits we are converting utilities, railroads and factories to burn up the most valuable and rarest fuels that we own, although an equally efficient source of energy is available in ample supply.

Today we think of coal as a vital necessity justifying the most drastic intervention—when the miners are on strike. For the rest of the time we forget the industry entirely. That is partly Lewis' fault. His welfare fund, for example, pays out $100 million a year in money contributed by the public and yet the public is denied an accounting of the fund's operation. Even the miners are forbidden to hold a vested interest in its management.

But coal is far bigger than Lewis. The government is engaged in a highly successful program of research into new uses of coal. There is still a further need for action to tide the industry over the next ten years. Nationalization is probably not the answer. But a national fuel policy is urgently needed, to conserve our fuel

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resources, to maintain our fuel capacity and to ensure that a dwindling national asset is used in the best national interest.

Long before the public can step in, however, the mines, miners and the operators will have to learn to live together. Faced with complete extinction by flooding and loss of markets, mine workers and operators are working together in Pennsylvania's anthracite industry. Three forward-looking mine workers' leaders, in Shamokin, Hazleton and Scranton, meet with the operators to settle grievances, allocate production and plan joint welfare and safety programs. Clinics for silicosis are springing up in every anthracite town. The bargaining sessions may grow bitter, but at least there is bargaining and contracts are observed.

The bituminous industry faces the same basic threat. It is up to the operators and Lewis to bury the hatchet and work together.

THE WEEK

THE ECONOMIC TREND

The government economists, who have predicted most accurately in the recent past, now think that the economic curve is due to start upward again. Assuming that the coal strike will soon be settled, they expect last year's upward economic trend to resume for at least the first half of 1950. Beyond this, most of them are unwilling to be specific. They agree that the big question is, Will the upturn last long enough and go far enough to restore full employment?

Even to get back to the full-employment level of 1948, these experts are reminding the White House, will require a higher rate of production than we had at the peak of last year's prosperity. Last year's levels of production will not be high enough to ensure prosperity in 1951 or 1952, since the productivity of American workers has been increasing so vastly. The increase in worker productivity and the addition of 500,000-750,000 more workers to the labor force every year are the main factors worrying the government analysts. To keep these two forces from unbalancing the economy, we must constantly add new areas of production. The realistic Washington economic thinkers admit we do not now have the dynamics to do that. Nor is there agreement in the Administration on a program that would supply the necessary dynamics.

There is concern over the fact that private industry still shows no inclination to adjust its prices to an increased volume of production. Government reports indicate that the auto industry, for example, is planning to produce considerably under 1948-49 levels. Substantially larger programs of public investment in production will, therefore, obviously be required to prevent mass unemployment. The President's recommendations for greater social security, international assistance and resource development, it is pointed out, will be even more urgent this January than they were last.

The translation of this thinking into political decisions will be started during the three weeks President Truman spends at Key West: How much of the national budget is to be earmarked for expanding the economy, and who is to be taxed how much more to pay for it?

EMPTY CHAIRS

The railroads, which more than almost any other industry fear government ownership, have taken a step that leads them closer to the fate they dread. Sixty Eastern roads, led by two dominant members, the New York Central and the Pennsylvania, have again raised the fares of passenger travel. Railroad service east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio and Potomac Rivers will be 44 percent more costly than it was in June, 1946, and 34 percent higher than it is in the rest of the country today. Unreserved coach fares from New York to Washington, and other points in the area, will be twice as much as bus fares, and will be equal to prewar Pullman rates. In some instances train travel will be more costly than air travel.

The increase to 3.375 cents a mile in coaches and 4.5 cents a mile in parlor and sleeping cars was authorized last week by the Interstate Commerce Commission in a six-to-four decision. The majority ruled that passenger-fare boosts "are necessary in order . . . to enable the railroads, under honest and efficient management, to provide adequate and efficient service."

Dissenting Commissioners Charles D. Mahaffie, chairman, and Clyde B. Aitchison, Walter Splawn and William E. Lee questioned whether the increase would actually result in more revenue for the railroads. "If the railroads still had substantially a monopoly of passenger transportation, increases in fares, as costs increase, might well be the proper procedure," Mahaffie said.

"The proven results of the fare increases made [by railroads] in July 1948," the minority said, "serve as a further warning that measures other than additional increases in fares are necessary if the steady declines in passenger revenues of these roads are to be stopped. . . . Vacant seats, rather than inadequate fares, are the prime cause of passenger deficits. In addition to continued improvement in their passenger services, the time has arrived for these petitioners to experiment with reduced fares rather than with further increases," Mahaffie emphasized.

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NO RETREAT ON FEPC

In a recent address to the National Council of Negro Women, President Truman again promised that there will be "no retreat and no retirement" on civil rights in his Administration. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the CIO, the ADA and the American Civil Liberties Union have combined in a mobilization campaign to help the President keep his pledge promptly. Local rallies will be held throughout the country between now and January 1, and a national rally in Washington on January 15, to urge Congress to act on fair-employment-practices legislation in the first 30 days of the new session. Senate Majority Leader Scott Lucas has given these groups his word that he will work to this end. Representative John Lesinski (D, Mich.) can bring the FEPC bill up for action on any second or fourth Monday after Congress reassembles, since his House Labor Committee reported the bill out favorably in the last session.

The FEPC has been selected as the first civil-rights objective for next year because it is the only one of the bills on the Senate calendar at present, the anti-poll-tax and anti-lynching measures being locked in committee, and wider support exists for it than for either poll-tax reform or anti-lynching legislation. In past tests, FEPC legislation has proved the strongest runner in the Senate—in 1946, when a closure petition was offered to bring up the FEPC, 48 signed the petition, 36 opposed.

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FIRST EGYPTIAN MUMMY (RUSSIAN)
FIRST BOLT OF LIGHTNING (RUSSIAN DISCOVERY)
FIRST MOUNTAIN MOVED BY ATOMIC POWER

HERBLOCK IN THE WASHINGTON POST

"Oh-oh, we may need a new building for this one."

YOUNG AND OLD OBJECT

SAN FRANCISCO (NR correspondent)

The University of California faculty, in the name of academic freedom, has appointed a committee to place its case against loyalty oaths before the Board of Regents. The anti-Communist oath was prescribed for them by the Regents last March. In October the faculty met and unanimously agreed to ask the Regents to rescind the oath. The Regents refused, but later amended the oath in an effort to sugar-coat the pill. Still dissatisfied, the faculty held a fourth rally against the oaths last week. It is noteworthy that the leaders protesting the compulsory oath are not only the young instructors, but many of the most conservative of the University's gray-haired professors, who could hardly be called liberal, let alone "radical" or "Red."

The professors have made it clear that they believe Communists should not teach in the state university, but they believe some means other than a loyalty oath should be used to find out who is a party member and who isn't.

About 25 percent of those employed by the University so far have failed to sign the oath. One of the objectives of the newly appointed faculty committee is to gain assurance from the Regents that no "sanctions" shall be visited upon those who haven't put their names below the sacred words: "I am not a member of the Communist Party. . . ."

WRONG-WAY WALLGREN

The private utilities are already reaping benefits from their successful fight to prevent Leland Olds's reappointment to the Federal Power Commission. In its first official act since President Truman's friend Mon Wallgren replaced Olds, the FPC has done great damage to the Central Valley Project in California—the Administration's public-power promise in the West. Without a dissenting vote, the Commission handed the Pacific Gas and Electric Company of San Francisco one of the biggest plums any utility company has dared even to ask for—a 50-year license for the construction and operation of hydroelectric development in the Kings River Basin of California and a preliminary permit for investigation of proposed development in the Fresno Irrigation District.

The FPC's action blocked the Federal Bureau of Reclamation's comprehensive plan for development of the Central Valley along TVA lines, which included:

- Supplemental irrigation for two million acres of land now partially irrigated to relieve farmers in the area who are forced to plant short crops because of low water supply. And additional irrigation of three million acres not now irrigated at all.
- Control of sea-water overflow on 360,000 acres of rich delta land where the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers merge.
- Generation of 8,100 million kilowatt hours of electrical energy.
- Construction of 38 major multiple-purpose dams, 28 hydroelectric plants, as well as necessary steam plants, transmission lines and irrigation facilities.

The plan was submitted to the President last August. He returned it to the Bureau of Reclamation, saying

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that while the report fell short of the main objective—a comprehensive valley plan—it demonstrated the need for immediate construction of three hydroelectric plants by the Bureau and eight multiple-purpose reservoir projects (five of which are now under construction).

Meanwhile, the FPC proceeded with hearings on the Pacific Gas and Electric Company's application, following which, last December, the FPC examiner in the case issued a decision that the public interest "will best be served" if the power resources of the Kings River Basin are developed by the federal government. PG&E appealed, and oral argument was heard by the Commission on October 13 of this year. The five-member Commission acted with unprecedented speed. Wallgren, who as a new Commissioner had not even heard the arguments, voted with the others in favor of the utilities.

This decision puts the Administration in an embarrassing position. Only a month ago the Democrats held a rally at San Francisco and reaffirmed pledges to the West for more public power and federal valley development.

There are strong indications that the Bureau of Reclamation will file for a rehearing to restore development of the vast resources of Central Valley to federal jurisdiction.

TIME FOR TEA

Gone are the days of a nickel cup of coffee—even for members of Congress. The House and Senate restaurants have announced that coffee is 10 cents, "and no free seconds." While consumers have watched the price of a pound of coffee climb from 60 cents to $1 (depending on the brand), coffee experts have been studying the international situation.

The world supply of exportable coffee is 29 million bags (132 pounds to one bag). The demand today is around 32 million bags. Before the war the United States consumed annually 14 million bags. Today consumption is 50 percent above prewar level. Europe, which had little or no coffee during the war, now is drinking about nine million bags' worth.

The prospect for lower prices looks dim. Brazil, the major coffee-producing country, has finally used up the eight-million-bag surplus developed before the war which had kept postwar coffee prices at a reasonable level. It would take four years to cultivate new coffee plantations. Citizens of the US now consume more than one-half the world's coffee production, but only about a twentieth of the global tea crop. Tea companies are planning a big promotion campaign next year with "Hot Tea Week" in January and "Iced Tea Week" in July. It's enough to make coffee producers boil.

OUTSIDE AMERICA

The Rhineland's coal-and-steel heavy industry used to be dominated by seven great *Konzerns*. Now there are fourteen "industrial units." The men in charge, however, are the same as those who practised the *Herr im Hause* system under the Kaiser, under Weimar, under Hitler: Kost in coal, Dinkelbach in steel, Henle, Bruns, Viet, Reusch, Zangen, Pferdmenges and others equally—and unpleasantly—familiar.

Thanks to the efficiency of these "masters-in-the-house"—and no one who had any experience with the German war machine in either of the two wars can doubt their efficiency—Western Germany's steel production rose sharply during the first half of 1949. They worked under some handicaps, since the passing fancy of the political masters, the Western high commissioners, made cartels unpopular—a lamentable but not irreparable difficulty. In the past, under Weimar for example, they had faced and overcome similar handicaps, learning how to interpret the will rather than the word of official decrees. This time too, they guessed—and apparently accurately—that the political masters weren't really eager to shackle an industrial production so necessary for the supreme purpose of all politics—war, of course.

So they resorted to the *Frühstückskartelle;* they made "gentleman's agreements" at pleasant business luncheons. The trend, they knew, was in their favor. The old, enormously powerful German Manufacturers Association was coming to life once more at Köln under the charmingly ambiguous title, Committee for Economic Questions. There was nothing unclear, however, about the fact that the committee grouped 32 economic associations which control about 90 percent of Western Germany's industrial production. Nor did they mistake the meaning of the desire of their American associates to have *Gesetz-75* changed to prevent any of the property confiscated and held by the Western Allies from being nationalized.

To these German gentlemen it was splendid news that the American capital already coming into Western Germany out of frozen funds and through the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau would some day soon reach Kolossal proportions; that French capital would also be arriving in the near future; that a deal was being worked out between the French Comité des Forges and the Vereinigte Stahlwerke; that the "danger" of nationalization of I. G. Farben and Luverkusen now seemed averted; that Dr. Ludwig Erhard, the Bonn Minister of National Economy, whose ideas about free enterprise are theirs too, had talked in a "gentlemanly" fashion in Paris with Finance Minister Maurice Petsche, whose ideas are not much different.

Excellent news also came to them from the entourage of Secretary Acheson about the unpublished details of the talks the American had had in Paris with Ernest Bevin and Robert Schuman. Moreover, not only was Acheson the first man of his rank to visit the Bonn state; the Paris conference had been called largely because of the reasonable (to them) proposals of Dr. Konrad Adenauer on dismant-

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ling, lifting the steel-production ceiling, changing the occupation statute and, last but not least, rearmament. Perhaps Bonn would not get—at least not yet—the 25 divisions he wanted, but three German divisions for each 30 French would be a start, and from the Weimar days the gentlemen remembered what could be done with a start.

The gentlemen are convinced that a Ruhr-France-Benelux industrial axis is as "natural" as the American Pennsylvania-Lake Superior axis, and of course they are ardently in favor of the forces of nature as against such artificialities as controlled planning for peacetime use. After all, they argue, don't a half-dozen American companies still control more than two-thirds of the American steel and chemical industries after a dozen decades of anti-trust laws? And isn't America the supreme example of efficiency?

American gentlemen, these Ruhr masters-in-the-house believe (with justifiable pleasure though not necessarily with accuracy), are now taking over from such persons as Henry Morgenthau. Even that most understanding American, Herbert Hoover, would be able to see eye to eye with John J. McCloy. What has happened, the *Herren* say, is that Acheson has seen the folly of worrying about such petty details as the *methods* of reactivating the Ruhr potential when there is the defense of the Elbe to be considered. Has not General Omar Bradley said that the defense of the Elbe is a "good calculated risk" and has not Acheson been quoted as saying that such a defense would be impossible if there were "a hostile German population behind us"?

The American gentlemen—so their Rhenish counterparts say—are also learning fast the rules of *Machtpolitik*. Hasn't Acheson been quoted in Frankfurt as saying that from now on the secret reports of the American military-intelligence services will be communicated to the European military officers responsible for the defense of the Atlantic Pact countries but NOT to their governments? And weren't the Americans brushing aside the silly civilian susceptibilities of old-fashioned, decadent (if not degenerate) Europeans by sending over teams of experts to tell the dependent European governments how the MAP arms should be used? Didn't an Associated Press message from London quote a "high official" as saying that America wanted to "get into Germany's good graces" so that Germany would "fight the *whole* coming war on the side of the West"? It was only logical, and efficient, the Rhinelanders say, that the Americans should take the same precautions in Western Europe. That, after all, is *Machtpolitik* as it should be.

Other Germans are less sure. There is, for example, Dr. Kurt Schumacher, the Socialist leader, who believes that the extreme swing from Morgenthauism to this new variety of Hooverism will make Western Germany an industrial (and military) satellite of the kind of American capitalism that did NOT get a vote of confidence at the polls on November 8. There are other Germans among the unemployed—about 1,300,000 on the dole now, with the total expected to reach 2,500,000 by the middle of the winter—who can't eat steel or live in the ultra-modern luxury stores, business offices and government buildings which make up the bulk of the new construction. These Germans know only too well the meaning of the statement that recovery in Western Germany "has virtually come to a standstill," contained in the report of the United Nations' Economic Commission for Europe.

Such Germans have questions too. Hasn't the Western policy of building up a reactionary nationalist Germany as a weapon against the East old and not altogether comforting precedents? Didn't America finance Germany during the two wars as "insurance" and wasn't the enemy of America in the second a worse version of the enemy in the first? Or, going back much further, didn't the German General Wrede in the Napoleonic battle of Leipzig go over to the Russians with his 40,000 Saxons?

And in Western Europe, among liberals in particular, the question is whether the Americans have calculated *all* the risks. The Manchester *Guardian* writes:

> Europe is proving a very much more complicated affair than many Americans imagined. . . . Neither politically, economically, nor militarily have current negotiations been going to plan. . . . The keener European federalists are disappointed. . . . Hoffman has called for economic "integration," with January 15 unofficially mentioned as the deadline for those signs of European enthusiasm which have not so far been forthcoming. And on the military side Great Britain and France, divided by incompatibilities that go farther than the quirks of rival generals, are coöperating none too well under either the Brussels Treaty or the Atlantic Pact. . . . The more ambitious pieces of "integration"—such as the Franco-Italian Customs Union or Benelux—have come to remarkably little; and the naïve picture of a federalized, integrated Western Europe, largely supplied if not actually led by a hard-working West Germany freed of all shackles, can be seen to be quite unreal. Before they can in any measure replan Europe, the Foreign Ministers have got to be clear just what danger Western Germany represents. . . . Germany is unlikely for a long time to be able or willing to launch another war; but if she is not to be the cause of one she has in fact to be neutralized, and the world must be convinced that she will stay so.

The point is, as *Le Monde* of Paris observes, that "It is not true that the United States and Western Europe are threatened in the same way, to the same extent, by the same danger." For America, the qualification about World War III having become *when* rather than *whether*, the problem of the Elbe has completely replaced the problem of the Ruhr. For Europe, the war has not yet become a fatal inevitability; the prospect of Europe as its battleground and Europeans its foot-soldiers has not yet been accepted by the masses; and whether or not the Americans see the Germans as America's soldiers, the Europeans can't see them as Europe's saviors.

PERCY WINNER

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THE BRANNAN PLAN

by A. G. Mezerik

THE TAXPAYERS of the nation spend millions of dollars each year in subsidies to farmers. New and greater subsidies are proposed in each Congress by both parties—as indeed they must be. With every farm bill that is passed, the real grievance of the city people grows deeper. They pay taxes to support the farmer so that he can grow the food which they need to eat. Do they then get it at a price which reflects the money they have already invested in subsidies? They do not—as eggs at 99 cents a dozen prove every day. On every front, agricultural products are available in unparalleled abundance, while, paradoxically, the city consumer pays the inflationary prices associated with the lean years of scarcity.

A Democratic administration, which has its basic voting strength in industrial city workers, could have been expected, sooner or later, to become conscious of the political danger inherent in this picture. That it has now awakened is to the credit of Charles Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture, who, in proposing the Brannan Plan, has found a way out of the dilemma which now restricts consumption of agricultural produce by the city worker. The essence of Brannan's proposal is simple—let the eggs, the cheese, the milk and all other products for which the farmer receives payment at a high government support price, find their own price level on the grocer's shelves. With a glut overhanging the market, those prices will be low, and the city worker will get the benefit of the money he has paid in taxes to help the farmer maintain a standard of living comparable to that of the skilled city worker.

In every way—and especially politically—the first part of that proposition, reasonable prices, appeals to the city worker. The second part, a sustained high income, has an equal appeal to the family farmer. The two parts together constitute the makings of a political coalition, the beginnings of which can already be seen in some states.

The Brannan Plan is building up as one of the greatest of national issues, even as editors, commentators and the politicians of both parties pontificate that it is only a memory. At the very same time that Governor Dewey, campaigning for the election of Senator Dulles, was telling upstate New York audiences that a vote for Dulles is a vote against "the package phony Brannan Plan," the Republican National Committee's farm meeting in Sioux City was hearing demands from farmers for a Republican type of Brannan Plan.

At the Democratic Party meeting in San Francisco, in late September, the story was the same. The party workers and leaders of the West were reflecting a grassroots feeling for Brannan and his plan, a feeling not shared by most politicians—or indeed by the leaders of the biggest farm organization, the American Farm Bureau Federation.

From the day that the Brannan Plan was announced, the leaders of the Bureau led an envenomed attack on it. In some circles this attack was thought to be the consequence of Allen Kline's personal feeling of bitterness. Kline, head of the Bureau, is reported to feel that the post now held by Brannan was logically his own. But that personal feeling, however strong it is, was not the decisive factor which brought the Bureau's big guns to bear on the Brannan Plan.

The Farm Bureau, though it has enrolled many small farmers in some states, is the voice and the apparatus of the very biggest factory-farm operators of the country. The Brannan Plan favors the operator of the small farm—Brannan Plan subsidy benefits decline as farm operations become larger—a provision which is anathema to big farmers. The Brannan Plan insists on prescribed minimum soil-conservation practices, acreage allotments and marketing quotas. Though none of these is a new departure in farm legislation, the big farmers oppose them all and have hoped to do away with them. Along with their opposite numbers in industry they demand subsidies, while they term all regulation "statism," "regimentation" and "the welfare state."

Moreover, and quite naturally, the big farmers of the Bureau are monopoly-minded. Kline spelled this out when he told a nationwide radio audience, "It's a good thing to emphasize the complete interest of all the rest of the economy in having a relatively few people produce the necessary food." The Brannan Plan will eliminate the opportunity for the big squeeze on small farmers.

Finally the Farm Bureau is in firm control of the most effective apparatus in government—the County Agent system, operated jointly by the Department of Agriculture and the Land Grant Colleges. This is the most vital of all the Bureau's instruments, since its in-

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fluence is felt on every farm in the land. The Brannan Plan, building—as it does—the strength of the small farmer, is bound to cut the Farm Bureau County Agent monopoly down to size, and this the Bureau cannot brook.

Every reason that the Farm Bureau has for opposing the Brannan Plan is a reason for the National Farmers Union to support it—which it has done vigorously since the plan was announced. This is the organization of family farmers who own and operate the acres on which they live. They believe firmly in the principles of soil conservation and of regional development and they believe equally firmly in the coalition of interest of the working farmer and the working people of the cities. The NFU also realizes that government is now the decisive factor in the stability of agricultural economy and it wants to move the small farmer into the position of influence with government which is now occupied by the Farm Bureau through the County Agent system. Finally, it is committed irrevocably to the proposition that the family farmer shall receive an income on a par with that gained by any other group of workers in the nation.

As soon as the Brannan Plan was announced, the leaders of the NFU undertook to convince Senators and Representatives of the merits of the plan; but with its philosophy and approach, the NFU did not find a welcome awaiting it in the offices of most of the Southern delegations, who immediately saw a threat to the plantation operations to which they are so firmly wedded. Congressmen who do the bidding of the Associated Farmers in California and the many legislators of Southwestern and Intermountain States, who are, first and foremost, spokesmen of the great ranchers, were equally hostile. Confronted with this lineup, the NFU moved out into the grassroots to do its convincing and the fur began to fly.

In Alabama, Aubrey Williams, president of the Alabama Farmers Union, debated the Brannan Plan with the state president of the Farm Bureau in the columns of the Montgomery *Advertiser*. Farmers read the arguments pro and con carefully. They began to ask questions, in letters to their local papers and especially in the meetings of their farm organizations. A fire was lit.

Heat from that fire is already singeing the Bureau. Today Alabama leaders of the Farmers Union report a tremendous increase of interest in their organization—an interest which grows directly out of the small farmer's belief that the Bureau has let him down. And as the conviction grows that it is the Brannan Plan which will supply his needs, the farmer's letters to his Congressmen grow more emphatic.

Alabama is not foremost in the nation's agriculture. Iowa is. There the highly respected *Wallaces' Farmer and Iowa Homesteader* polled its readers and found that of the farmers who knew about the Brannan Plan, more liked the sound of it than didn't. Minnesota has had two polls—independently taken. The last vote was ten to four in favor of the Brannan Plan. The great future political significance in these figures is made clear by looking at the record of the 1948 Truman victory. In Iowa Truman's majority was less than 35,000. In Minnesota it was less than 184,000.

In these terms the Brannan Plan is readying a fine crop of political hay for reaping in the coming elections. This time, the efforts of the NFU are decisive. In Iowa, in Minnesota and in all the other states which are ordinarily Republican, the NFU is beating the bushes. State presidents debate the officials of the Farm Bureau. Polls become ammunition. In Arkansas a poll revealed that 56 of every 100 Bureau members were in favor of the Brannan Plan—despite the fact that both the national president and the Arkansas state president of the Bureau are vociferously on record against it.

The meetings, the results of the polls and the discussion in the country papers are riddling Farm Bureau morale as applications for membership begin to come to the NFU from dissident Farm Bureau members. In one township in Minnesota last year the Farmers Union did not have a single member. Today 47 of the 68 farmers in the township have joined the NFU; only one signed up with the Bureau.

According to James Patton, president of the National Farmers Union, the drive toward the Brannan Plan and his own organization is firmly based on the agricultural facts of life. The yields of both wheat and corn are straining the storage capacity of the country. A vast new cotton crop is crowding the 5.25-million-bale surplus carried over unused from 1948. In storage now are 203 million dozen eggs, 175 million gallons of dried milk, 55 million pounds of butter and 2.25 million pounds of cheese. The production of potatoes and of many other crops far exceeds the present demand.

Surplus, as a continuing phenomenon of American agriculture, is helping farmers to realize the political meaning of the great revolution in agriculture which

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has characterized the last ten years. Since 1940, crop yields per acre have increased by more than 25 percent. In the next decade the gains are expected to be even more spectacular. The reasons are to be found in improved technology, in the reduction of rate of soil loss and in the reinvigoration of soils which had become impoverished. Agricultural technology is in its infancy and it is on the growth of this factor that the predictions are made for greater acceleration of production in the future.

Patton expresses the problem in these words, "We have got to learn to live with abundance and like it." Politically the farmer's security is wedded to the worker's ability to get all the food he wants at reasonable prices. If the farmer is to have the benefit of continuing support by the taxpayers, last year's waste cannot be often repeated. In 1948, according to Secretary Brannan, "Taxpayers bought one bushel of potatoes for every three produced and got no good out of them," a situation duplicated in many other foods. The politics of abundance demand coalition between farmer and worker. In the Brannan Plan, the leaders of the NFU see a welding iron with which an active, political farmer-worker alliance can be created. This, of course, has always been a liberal pipe dream, except during the early thirties when both groups were economically shattered and on relief together. The missing economic link may be found in the Brannan Plan.

Secretary Brannan and the Democratic high command are obviously proceeding on this theory. Brannan has been given the green light. Though his travels are less publicized, he has already roamed as widely as the President to take his program to the country. In the next months Brannan will be all over the lot. The Republicans will be fighting him with the same success that they would a feather bed, since they have no program for the small farmer and they have no hope of carrying the cities.

Meanwhile, the Farm Bureau, *Life* magazine, the *Wall Street Journal*, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the metropolitan press and the radio will continue to smother news of the Brannan Plan. When they mention it at all, it will be to remark that "the vicious regimentation of the Brannan Plan has been buried under a wave of protest from the farmers themselves." And Congress, tied in knots because it does not want a farm program which favors small farmers any more than it wants a program which would favor small business or workers, has passed a bill which, though it grants high price supports, favors the big farmer and gouges the consumer. The act, passed on the last day of the session, is in the grand tradition of Congressional stalling. The stalling is a bluff which will be called in the elections to come.

There will be only a few political tests of the Brannan Plan this year. But even those few will shake the boys who think they have buried it. In 1950 and '52, the Brannan Plan will be the great issue in the doubtful states. After that, Congress will enact a new farm bill—one which is based on low prices for consumers and a high standard of living for family farmers.

THE DILEMMA OF LIBERAL CATHOLICS

by Percy Winner

ON THE EVE of the start of the Holy Year of 1950, Pope Pius XII has made an official pronouncement on a subject of very great present interest to all progressives in the democratic world of the West—the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church toward the fundamental rights of man as they are conceived in the laical tradition of liberal democracy.

To the participants in the International Congress of Humanistic Studies who had come to pay their respects to him at the Vatican, the head of the Church said:

> Natural order is the foundation of the social doctrine of the Church. It is precisely the Church's Christian conception of the world that has inspired and sustained it in the edification of its social doctrine on such a foundation. The combat of the Church to conquer or defend its own liberty is carried out also for true liberty, for the fundamental rights of man. In the eyes of the Church, these essential rights are so inviolable that no reason of state, no pretext of common good, will be able to prevail against them. They are protected by an unsurmountable barrier. On this side of the barrier, the common good can make laws in its own semblance. Beyond the barrier it cannot touch these rights because they are that which is most precious in the common good.

The importance of the pronouncement is that it suggests an identity of the Church's rights with the fundamental rights of man; and that it tends to put both in a reserved area that is not only beyond the rights of laical state legislation but also beyond any non-religious,

This is the third of a series on the Catholic Church in the context of today's problems. The fourth and last article, dealing with the growing power of the rightist elements in the Church, will appear in an early issue.

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even non-Catholic, conception of the common good.

The Pope's statement is one of a series he has made recently in clarification of the Church's attitudes toward current moral and material problems. High prelates of the Church have also been making statements; one of these was a long letter to Catholics of France from that nation's four cardinals—Achille Lienart of Lille, Pierre-Marie Gerlier of Lyons, Jules Saliege of Toulouse and Clement Roques of Rennes.

The obvious reason for these pronouncements is the preparation for the celebration of the Jubilee. Both the Catholic Church and the defenders of democracy are engaged in a struggle against totalitarian Communism. On its front the Church is about to mobilize its faithful followers in a massive show of power; the millions of pilgrims and tourists who will come to Rome during the coming twelvemonth will be part of this show of force. And for the benefit of the militants on the allied front—that of democracy—the Church, through its various recent statements, is explaining not only what it is fighting *against* but what it is fighting *for*.

There is, however, a less obvious but not less important reason for the clarifications. Holy Year comes at a time when not inconsiderable numbers of thoughtful Catholics in many parts of the world are facing a problem of personal choice that comes close to being a crisis of conscience. They confront an inner conflict between an unreserved allegiance, dictated by religious faith, to the Church's spiritual authority, and a reservation of obedience to the Church, functioning as a temporal power active in practical politics along lines that seem to call into question the liberal democratic faith in human progress.

The problem is not new. On the contrary, it has a long historical past, and in its present form it has been developing during the entire generation since the Russian Revolution of 1917. The fact that Russian Communism became an enemy of liberal democracy, and Catholicism, by its opposition to Communism, apparently an ally of progress, changed the terms of the problem. But it reëmerged in its older form during the years after World War II when the Church actively entered the arena of practical politics on behalf of a social doctrine which seemed a competitor rather than a supporter of liberal democracy.

It has been plain for several years, especially since the Italian national election of the spring of 1948, that the social doctrine to which the Pope referred in his pronouncement to the humanists is not merely an article of faith, nor a theoretical concept. It is a practical political goal of great significance in the field of that common good which, by the liberal democratic concept, is the province of laical state legislation. A number of national governments—in South and Central America, in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Western Germany, Austria and Belgium—are strongly influenced by it in their attitudes toward education, toward social and labor legislation, indeed toward the structure of the state itself.

The question that is troubling thoughtful liberal Catholics is whether the Church in its struggle against Communism is not also impairing liberal democracy. And this question has been brought into sharp focus during the months since the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office published its decree threatening with the extreme ecclesiastical penalty of excommunication not only Catholics who remained avowed Communists but also Catholics who even indirectly or unwittingly serve social and political ends which happen also to be professed by the Communists. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that among liberal Catholics in Western Europe the Church's implicitly political use of the power of excommunication has invited a challenge similar to the one made on the political use of indulgences by Johann Reuchlin and Martin Luther in the sixteenth century.

The problem is most serious in France, for that country is not only the one which has more militant Catholic liberals than any other in the modern world. France is the country where the conflicting tendencies within the Church itself—between reserving itself to its spiritual mission and embarking on a temporal bid for power, between traditionalist conservatism and liberalism—have had their most dramatic expressions. It was the eighth-century French King Pepin whose historic "Donation of Pepin" firmly established the Church's temporal power; it was the eighteenth-century French revolution that even more than the sixteenth-century Protestant revolution challenged the Church's absoluteness of spiritual authority. It was a French army that restored a temporal throne to a reactionary pope in the middle of the last century; and it was in the French *maquis* of only a few years ago that ardent Catholics and fanatical Communists were able to fight shoulder to shoulder against a common enemy of the fundamental rights of man.

More than any other country has France given intellectuals to the Church. Bossuet and Pascal have had their successors in a rich literary tradition that runs from Chateaubriand and Péguy to Léon Bloy, from Georges Bernanos to Psichari and Emmanuel Mounier, from Maurice de Guérin to Verlaine, from Veuillot to Barbey d'Aurevilly, from Francis Jammes to Paul Claudel and François Mauriac. Few living Catholic lib-

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erals have had more world influence than Jacques Maritain.

It is not surprising therefore that the most serious challenges to the decree of the Holy Office should have come from France. On the political Left, Mounier, the editor of *Esprit*, the most important Catholic liberal publication in France, called upon the Church to dismiss the impression that the Vatican had swung hard Right. And Mauriac, the greatest living Catholic novelist in France, went even farther. A man of the far Right, he nevertheless called upon the Vatican to exempt from the sanctions of the decree all the Catholic progressive movements in Western Europe, even including those which are connected with Communism. In the *Figaro*, he wrote:

In France many faithful Catholics refuse to resign themselves to established injustice, to that unjust order against which the Church cannot fail to act. . . . Here in France the Marxists have not renounced the Christian promise, the good news brought to all men, and above all to the poor. Despite their membership in the Communist Party, there are thousands upon thousands of poor men, industrial workers, students who are Catholics.

Two of the recent statements made by Pope Pius were indirect answers to these appeals. Though they were made in one case to Germans and in the other to Belgians, their real goal was the Catholic liberals—men of the kind who attended the sessions of the Week of Catholic Intellectuals in Paris. In a broadcast to German Catholics, the Pope said:

If, recently, a dividing line has been traced, compulsory for all Catholics, between Catholic faith and atheistic Communism, this has been done . . . to create dikes, to save not only workers but without exception everyone faced by Communism, which denies all religion. The decree has nothing to do with the contrast between rich and poor, between capitalists and proletarians, between owners and those who have no property. It concerns preservation and purity of religion and of Christian faith; liberty of their action; and in sum, happiness and dignity, rights and liberty of the workers.

In further amplification of this position of neutrality in what the Marxist doctrine calls the class war, the four French cardinals issued a 3,000-word public letter to the Catholics of France. No exact counterpart of the letter seemed to have been found necessary in any other country—an indication of the gravity of the crisis of conscience among French Catholic liberals. The cardinals wrote:

A Catholic will be careful to avoid saying, in the midst of conflict that pits Communists against anti-Communist powers, that the Church has engaged itself in the ranks of one of the two parties. The Church refuses to join a "crusade" in which are intermixed so many temporal and economic rivalries and interests; it knows that by doing so it would compromise the purity of its mission, which is essentially spiritual. . . . In condemning the action of the Communist parties, the Church does not take the part of capitalism. . . . In the very idea of capitalism—in the absolute value it confers on property without reference to the common good or the dignity of labor—there is a materialism rejected by Christian teaching.

But the letter of the cardinals also said:

Not only are Catholics forbidden to work for and to spread newspapers and publications which favor the doctrine or action of the Communist Party but they may not even read them. . . . In our country where the Communist Party is a political party which functions like other parties, it is to be feared that Catholics, in the desire to clarify their opinions as citizens and as voters, may allow themselves to read these publications, and hence to be affected by their insidious arguments. If they faithfully submit to the decision of the Holy Office they will escape from this grave danger for their souls.

Thus the letter of the cardinals aggravated rather than helped solve the problem of liberal Catholics. For what troubles these doubters is not whether the Church does or does not take the part of capitalism. They see dangers to the Church itself in an interpretation of its spiritual mission that permits it to enter areas of specifically material concern as a major participant, and that allows it to threaten to use the ecclesiastical weapon of excommunication to maintain a species of exclusivity in the field of the reform of capitalism. Such an invocation of higher law as is implied in the Pope's statement to the humanists seems to put the Church in the position of embarking on a reform "crusade" of its own, not only competing with liberal democracy but also denying its rights. And if, as the cardinals wrote, a Frenchman cannot hope to save his soul without renouncing his rights and duties as a citizen to weigh freely and objectively the political arguments of all parties, then the Church is striking at the very foundations of the fundamental rights of man as they are conceived in the laical tradition of liberal democracy.

The four cardinals warned French intellectuals against lending themselves in any way to movements and manifestations in which Communists were involved. A Catholic who allowed his "reputation or talent" to be used, even to be present at a sports event, would be considered an unfaithful son of the Church. To this order the liberal Catholic reply was the plea that it should not be applied literally for fear that the intellectual life of France be turned over entirely to

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men whose orientations are Communist or at least extraneous to the spirit of Catholicism and neo-Thomism. Already the major figures in France are men far from Catholicism—men like Sartre, Camus, Montherlant, Malraux, Gide, Eluard, Aragon.

On a subject more directly relevant to the reform of capitalism, the four cardinals wrote:

After as well as before the decree of the Holy Office, the Church takes the side of the workers in the social conflict. For more than fifty years the popes have not ceased to teach that the condition of the workers in the present labor structure is not just. It is not just in the capitalist system. Nor is it more just in the Communist system, which merely concentrates in the hands of an all-powerful state the privileges taken away from private capitalism.

And on the same subject, the Pope in his broadcast to the Germans and Belgians said:

Since our predecessor, Leo XIII, nearly sixty years ago, issued the encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, few were the problems which more than the social questions have attacked the cares of the supreme pastors of the Church. All they could do to coöperate, through doctrine and precepts, toward solving, or at least toward mitigating, social inequalities, they have done. That which is important is that the social doctrine of the Church become the patrimony of all Christian consciences and that this doctrine be translated into practice. As a vital principle of human society, the Church must extend its influence in all fields of human existence.

These were words of special interest to the leaders and members of Catholic labor unions and of organizations active in labor affairs. There are such unions and organizations in all Western European countries; and in France, where their political role is unusually important, they include many liberal Catholics.

The Pope also said that "social activities require sacrifices from all interested," that "these sacrifices must be accomplished and admit delays today even less than in other times," and that "the particular interest of workers' organizations . . . should be sacrificed generously." Indeed, he said of labor unions, "May it please God that the day be not distant in which those organizations of self-defense made necessary until now by the defects of the economic system . . . can cease to function." While, he said, the Church approved the existence of labor unions, it did so only on condition that they be "based on the Christian laws" and "also have as their unbreakable foundation the effort to promote the Christian order in the field of labor." He referred to a "tendency to abuse" the power of labor organization, commenting that this was "much more dangerous and to be feared than the abuse of the power of private capital." To the Germans, he gave this statement of the Church's view of its social doctrine as applied to labor organization:

The Church . . . does not cease to act efficaciously so that the apparent contradictions between capital and labor, between the entrepreneur and the worker, should be transformed into a superior unity, that is into that organic coöperation of the two parts, wanted by nature itself, and consisting of collaboration of both parts according to the nature of the various activities, and according to the economic sectors in the coördination of professions.

To the Belgians, he said:

We never tire of recommending fervidly the elaboration of a statute of public law for economic life, indeed for the whole of social life in general, in accordance with the organization of society in professions.

So far as French liberal Catholics are concerned, these statements come close to bringing the official support of the Church to a new form of the political doctrine of the Corporative State embodied in Benito Mussolini's Charter of Labor of 1926. That system, which wiped out the Italian labor unions in the form in which they still exist in liberal democratic countries, was also based on the "organic coöperation" of all the forces of production in accordance with "professional" organization. Its foundation was the anti-liberal concept of the state as a "superior entity" transforming "the whole of social life" into a "superior unity." It was the "good Fascism" that has dominated the attitude toward labor of Franco, Salazar and Peron, and that in the period between 1926 and 1935 made Italian Fascism seem to many conservatives to be a "good" and "moral" solution of the problem of the relation between capital and labor.

The fact that the head of the Roman Catholic Church is quite aware of this possible interpretation of the social doctrine which the Church is supporting with all of its strength—both spiritual and temporal—emerges indirectly from his pronouncement to the humanists. He said:

Healthy human nature can do very much if it opens itself to every contribution of Christian faith. It can save man from the grip of "technocracy" and of materialism. . . . Humanism is now on the order of the day. . . .

It is doubtful, however, whether a social doctrine of the Church involving even a "humanized" neo-corporativism will solve the crisis of conscience of liberal Catholics worried about their Church's seeming use of its spiritual mission to enter temporal areas and of its invocation of religious punishments in the performance of material tasks. And the coming Holy Year, therefore, is likely to be decisive for their relations to the Church.

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HAROLD L. ICKES: *Farewell, Secretary Krug*

PRESIDENT TRUMAN could not have done better than he did in choosing Undersecretary Oscar L. Chapman to succeed Secretary Krug of Interior. This department, with its many diverse responsibilities, would be better off today if Mr. Chapman had been President Truman's original appointment. The new Secretary will have to devote time and energy to inculcate anew in his staff confidence in ability to perform and pride in the job that has been dissipated almost to the point of bankruptcy during the incumbency of Mr. Krug.

Mr. Chapman is not to blame for the serious deterioration of Interior that went on during recent years, to the great regret of those who were attached to it. Therefore, he is entitled to public support and understanding until he gets the Department on its feet again. Named as Assistant Secretary early in 1933, Mr. Chapman served in that position until he was appointed Undersecretary in 1946. Although Mr. Chapman does not have a civil-service status, in a real sense he is a career man. Moreover, he has a feeling for and an interest in the public service. He thoroughly knows Interior. In a Department that still has much to give away, he can be depended upon to protect the public interest from those who would exploit and cheat either the Indians or the public generally. As Secretary, Mr. Chapman will be content to devote himself to this full-time job without trying to build up any private business enterprise as a side line. He will never be a party defendant in a law suit involving the borrowing of $750,000 to be used in private business, while already under obligations to the people in a government post whose proper and conscientious performance is enough to tax the energy and ability of any man.

Mr. Krug's career as Secretary of the Interior has been both surprising and disappointing. He inherited a smooth-running, well-coördinated department whose morale was high. His successor will have the tough job of restoring self-confidence, now at a lower ebb than it has been since the days of Secretary Fall.

If Mr. Krug has failed, the failure has been his alone. President Truman wanted him to make good and gave him every opportunity to do so. From the beginning, Mr. Krug ran out on his department just as he ran out on the President himself during the 1948 campaign. Leaving it to others to determine policies and make decisions, Mr. Krug spent a great deal of his time traveling hither and yon with friends and retainers at public expense. These pleasure jaunts, plus the time and energy devoted to building up his textile mill at Knoxville, Tennessee, did not leave him time enough to attend properly to the affairs of his department. He did not believe in overtime for himself.

In due course, President Truman became aware that his Secretary of the Interior was derelict in his official duties. In numerous instances when he should have appeared before Congressional committees, he imposed that duty upon others. In the terrific fight that was carried on to repair the damage that the private power lobby had done in cutting to shreds the appropriation for the Bureau of Reclamation, Mr. Krug, the reputed friend of public power, was invisible. This sort of thing could not escape the notice of a vigilant President.

President Truman must have learned, too, that he could not trust Secretary Krug's recommendations with respect to legislation affecting the rights and property of the Indians. Mr. Krug turned up as the sponsor, or at least the supporter, of as vicious Indian legislation as has been introduced in Congress since the notorious Bursum Bill that Secretary Fall tried to put over. In order to protect the Indians as well as himself, President Truman had to turn to others for advice that it was safe to follow. It can hardly be doubted that it was for his failures and derelictions as Secretary of the Interior that President Truman finally asked for a resignation which should have been offered, but was not, a long time ago, although at the time that it was at last forthcoming, Mr. Krug pretended that he had been straining at the leash to get out of Interior.

President Truman could not justly have been subject to criticism if he had dropped Mr. Krug when he entered upon his first full term last January. Secretary Krug had run out on his chief during the desperately fought campaign last year. He hid in the sagebrush of the Far West where none could discover him. He failed to volunteer his services in the Truman campaign. He even refused to make speeches, except on one belated and inconsequential occasion. When, to the utter surprise of Mr. Krug, and others, President Truman did win, the Secretary tried to make it appear that his hideout for some forty days in the desert had, in fact, been a handout to the Democratic Party. This simply was not true. If, during this period, he ever gave out any statement in behalf of Mr. Truman, or made a speech, no alert reporter heard of it. The Comptroller General decided that Krug's had been an "inspection" trip—which permitted Mr. Krug to charge his expenses to his Department.

HAROLD L. ICKES

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FALL BOOK SECTION: PART I — RUSSIA

THE SOVIET ROLE IN GREAT-POWER POLITICS

by Julian Towster

THIS NEW STUDY of Russian foreign policy,[1] prepared under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, packs a lot of interesting material into its pages and makes a useful contribution to the diplomatic history of the critical prewar decade. It is well written, and the drama of the events it depicts should give it a wider audience than the world of scholars.

The work is more derivative and expository than original and analytical, for the task Max Beloff set himself was to examine a vast amount of chiefly non-Russian printed sources (rather than primary Soviet sources), weigh the material and present a compact and informative "narrative history of Soviet foreign policy." In this he succeeded admirably, despite the fact that he does not claim to be an expert on Soviet matters.

The first volume surveys Soviet policy from the autumn of 1929 to the German reoccupation of the Rhineland, showing the international position of the USSR at the inception of the first Five-Year Plan, and its policies during the rise of the Japanese and German aggressors, particularly the manifold Soviet search for collective security. The second volume carries the story to the time of the Nazi attack in 1941. Together, they comprise a comprehensive picture of Soviet activity in the League of Nations and other agencies of international organization, and of Soviet relations with Germany, the Western Powers and the US, the Middle and Far East, and to a lesser extent the countries of Eastern Europe. There are also chapters on "Soviet Nationalism and the Red Army" and the Seventh Congress of the Comintern.

Read carefully, Beloff's account sheds light on the flexibility and fallibility of Soviet foreign policy: the origins and consequences of the progressive shift since the mid-twenties to greater regularization of relations with the West and entrance into the League; the errors in Soviet estimates of Nazism; the changes in Comintern tactics and Soviet attitudes toward the Great Powers, stemming from the changing balance of power, as well as from the dual position of the USSR as leading force in world Communism and prominent member of the existing state system. Many interesting sidelights are provided on topics of lesser import.

Beloff's approach can be illustrated by reference to his treatment of the Munich affair. Marshaling every bit of available evidence, he traces the steps of the powers between the Austrian Anschluss of March 11-13, 1938, and Prague's final submission on September 28-30, giving due weight to the fears, suspicions and calculations of England and France. His thorough account reveals that the British leaders, set from the beginning upon a radical solution of the Nazi-Czech conflict through pressure on Prague, repeatedly rebuffed Soviet proposals for joint action to stop German aggression, deliberately excluding Russia from all deliberations, including those of the fateful days of September 20-30. It confirms the fact that while the French government periodically reasserted its intention to abide by the French-Czech Pact, its top military leaders were skeptical of Russia's armed strength and capacity to aid the Czechs in the face of Rumanian objection to Soviet troop passage; and it cites evidence that by September 13 France had definitely decided not to go to war in defense of Czechoslovakia. Beloff then documents at length the Soviet leaders' consistent pledges to assist Czechoslovakia if France would, bringing out Litvinov's suggestion to the French representative on September 2—reiterated on September 11—that the League Covenant be invoked to brand Germany the aggressor in order to overcome Rumania's objections, and that immediate staff talks be held among France, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. He even arrays the opinions of several reputable historians that Russia was ready to fight alone for the Czechs if the latter took up arms.

Having presented this record, Beloff adds his summary conclusion that it can be argued that the USSR was

PART I—RUSSIA

FOREIGN POLICY: Julian Towster; STALIN: E. H. Carr; YALTA: Richard Lauterbach; EASTERN DIPLOMACY: Joseph Barnes; NATURAL ECONOMY: Abram Bergson; LITERATURE: Ernest Simmons; GOVERNMENT: James R. Newman

PART II—CRITICS AND WRITERS

SCHOLARS AND READERS: Douglas Bush; THE PREOCCUPATIONS OF FICTION: Malcolm Cowley; MRS. TROLLOPE IN AMERICA: Robert Hatch; HOGBEN'S OUTLINE OF HISTORY: James R. Newman

[1] THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SOVIET RUSSIA, 1929-1941, by Max Beloff (The Oxford University Press: Vol. I, 1929-1936, $3.75; Vol. II, 1936-1941, $5).

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certain that France and Britain would not fight for Czechoslovakia, which would not resist without their support. "In these circumstances Soviet diplomats could go to the limit in pledging their country's readiness to resist aggression." To many a student of politics this will look like a rather strained interpretation on the basis of the evidence, so meticulously adduced by the author himself. Yet no one can complain that he has not offered the reader sufficiently ample and balanced material to enable him to arrive at his own conclusions. There are other debatable interpretations, but in its entirety the work is fair and dispassionate. In fact, by its thoroughness and objectivity, Beloff's study would serve as a wholesome corrective for the many one-sided treatments here and abroad, including the Soviet *Istoria Diplomatii* (1945), with its numerous silences and omissions.

Three main shortcomings may be noted in Beloff's otherwise commendable work: its meager utilization of Soviet and particularly Comintern materials, its several erroneous conceptions of internal Soviet factors, and its failure to offer a systematic analysis of the basic motivations of Soviet foreign activity. That Soviet archives will be opened in the near future, or intimate access to Soviet officials—such as made possible Louis Fischer's invaluable *The Soviets in World Affairs*—permitted again, is to be seriously doubted. All the more reason why such rich sources of Comintern history as the periodicals *Communist International* and *Imprecorr*, with its successors, should be exhaustively investigated and compared with official Soviet publications in order to arrive at the nuances of Soviet-Comintern policy. The author was unable to do that under wartime conditions in England and consequently, as the sponsors admit, the work is not definitive.

The author tends to overestimate the role of the Soviet press as a barometer of impending policy changes, and he depreciates the residue of doctrinal internationalism still maintained in the USSR. For all the stress on "Soviet patriotism," it can hardly be said that in its basic ideology the USSR has ceased to be a "world-state in embryo." Likewise, the emphasis on the Foreign Commissar's role is misplaced. Beloff believes that Chicherin carried over to his Soviet post the anti-British traditions of Imperial Russia's Foreign Office, and he speaks of Litvinov's free hand in the day-to-day conduct of Soviet foreign policy. The truth is that from the moment Chicherin attacked Stalin's nationality theories in a series of articles in *Pravda* in March, 1921, Stalin had little use for him. If Soviet policy was anti-British in the late twenties it was Politburo policy, not the reflection of Chicherin's early training. The same holds true of the collective-security and other policies so brilliantly executed by Litvinov. If personal discretion in Foreign Ministers is largely a thing of the past, it is least of all possible in an incumbent of the Soviet Foreign Office who is not a member of the Politburo.

Lastly, the concluding chapter on principles of Soviet foreign policy is among the weakest in the book. The author deliberately shies away from formulating the implications of his study in the shape of generalizations that might offer a guide to the statics and dynamics of Soviet foreign policy in the coming years. Surely there are priorities within the system of such contradictory and complementary principles as world revolution, security of the USSR, coexistence, competition, balancing and flexibility, and there is method in the manipulating of the symbols of social and ethnic cohesion. Elucidation is the first requirement of the day.

There is still need for a systematic survey of the entire period of Soviet foreign policy from 1917 to the present. For the postwar years, as is shown by the recent writings of Professor Philip E. Mosely, there are many angles of Soviet-American relations yet to be uncovered. The books on Russia by Vera M. Dean, Frederick L. Schuman, David J. Dallin and others published in recent years—whatever their individual merits—have covered various phases of Soviet foreign policy. It will still take many more books by thorough and objective scholars to fill the serious gaps in our knowledge of the methods, personnel and principles of Soviet diplomacy and of its psychological roots and manifestations, and to arrive at a definitive estimate of its capabilities and limitations.

Beloff's conscientious study is a valuable contribution to the task.

Professor Julian Towster is the author of Political Power in the USSR. *He is now a Senior Fellow at Columbia University's Russian Institute, working on a book on Russian diplomacy.*

The Riddle of a Public Face

by E. H. Carr

TOTALITARIANISM, in its proper sense of a demand for total conformity, quickly begets its counterpart: total denigration. Few books written nowadays in English about Stalin and Stalinism escape the totalitarian hallmark. The Communists and fellow travelers paint Stalin as the hero without reproach; the others see only the unprincipled enemy of mankind. If anyone finds Isaac Deutscher's biography uncomfortable reading, it will mean that his reflexes have become conditioned to these totalitarian responses. Deutscher himself is singularly immune from the totalitarian taint. When you have set down the book, you will not be able to answer in one word—or in one sentence—the question whether he approves or condemns. He does both, and sometimes simultaneously; for where he condemns—which he does often and severely—it is generally on the principle that the worst is the corruption of the best.

STALIN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY, by Isaac Deutscher (The Oxford University Press; $5).

Stalin emerges from Deutscher's pages as a complex figure. His personal

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life and character are unknown quantities, and nothing much is gained by speculating about them. Only one private letter of his has ever got into print; the few personal reminiscences about his early years (Trotsky rehashed most of them at tedious length in his biography) are nearly all colored by later jealousies and animosities. But Stalin's public face has been exposed to so much limelight that its riddle can be deciphered by those who take the trouble to study the facts. Its characteristic aspect is to look both ways—geographically, to Asia and to Europe; ideologically, to Russian nationalism and revolutionary internationalism. Stalin fits into no category and follows no historical prototype. If Lenin was the Robespierre of the Russian Revolution, and Trotsky its Danton, Stalin ought to be its Bonaparte: this is how he has often been regarded. But Stalin, unlike Bonaparte, is a revolutionary in his own right. He has neither destroyed nor wound up the revolution. He has continued it and he has Russianized it. He has nationalized it—and it remains none the less international.

To treat the present conflict in world affairs as a phase in the age-long opposition between East and West, a struggle between Asiatic barbarism and dictatorship and Anglo-Saxon democracy and enlightenment, is therefore a gross historical oversimplification. Of course, there is a grain of truth in calling Stalin an Easterner ("we Asiatics," he once said in a diplomatic flourish to Matsuoka, the Japanese envoy). He differed sharply from the men who made the Russian Revolution. They had spent years of exile in Western Europe and were deeply rooted in Western culture and tradition; the revolution was for them an international event. Lenin talked of the sacrifices which the Russian workers might have to make for the German revolution; none of the early Bolsheviks believed that the revolutionary regime could maintain itself in backward Russia if the revolution did not spread to the advanced proletariats of Germany and Western Europe.

After Lenin's death all that was done and finished with; and Stalin, with his "socialism in one country," can be regarded as the artificer of the change, or as the instrument and symbol of a change forced on Soviet Russia by the obstinate resistance of the capitalist world to the revolutionary process. What Stalin gave to the politically conscious people of Russia in the middle 1920's was an immense sense of release—release from the burdensome, hitherto accepted belief in Russia's dependence on the "advanced" countries of the Western world. He restored Russia's psychological independence, her belief in herself, her confidence that she could reach her goal irrespective of what might happen elsewhere. The corollary of this was the revival of Russia's claims as a great power, of her messianic role. That Stalin was the progenitor of this new outlook on the world, the high priest of this new national faith, accounts for the immense hold that he has obtained on the loyalties of the Russian people—a hold quite inexplicable in terms of dictatorship and despotism.

But for this a price had to be paid—not only in some of the cruder exhibitions of nationalism in word and deed, in some of the exaggerations



HARRY DIX

common to all newly acquired enthusiasms, but also in a revival of some of the less agreeable Russian traditions which the revolution seemed for the moment to have destroyed—bureaucracy, secret diplomacy, political obscurantism, ideological conformity. Some of this could hardly have been avoided. The revolution had after all been made in Russia by Russians; it had to be administered by Russians; whatever their beliefs and hopes and intentions, it could not be dissociated root and branch from the Russian past. One of Deutscher's many illuminating quotations is a passage from Lenin comparing the Bolsheviks in Russia to victorious invaders who, after their victory, are exposed to the risk of being submerged by the culture of the conquered nation. The risk was made a certainty by the isolation of Soviet Russia from Europe in the first formative years through the boycott of the Western allies.

While, however, Deutscher does full justice to Stalin's Asiatic face, the greatest service that his book makes to the understanding of the present imbroglio is to restore the balance by insisting on the dual significance of Stalin's career. If Stalin seems to have nationalized the revolution, to have revived the Russian national tradition, and to confront the world today as a threatening cloud on the Eastern horizon, the other aspect of his achievement is none the less real. Stalin as a revolutionary stands in the direct line of a Western tradition; and the revolution which he carried to its consummation is intimately bound up with the process of fitting Russia into a Western scheme of development. From the French Revolution the line of descent runs through Babeuf to Marx, and from Marx through Lenin to Stalin, picking up new accretions by the way, but substantially unbroken.

The revolution that Stalin inherited from Lenin was unfinished. It could not be finished without the industrialization of Russia, which could alone bring the victory of the proletariat and could alone provide the material

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resources for the building of socialism. But to complete the socialist revolution in this sense was, Lenin thought, impossible in a backward, predominantly peasant, country unless a socialist Europe came to its aid. Thus the famous New Economic Policy of 1921 was a temporary retreat dictated by the failure of the European revolution, the isolation of Russia and the need to compromise with the peasantry. But where was it to lead? Lenin, having brilliantly executed his tactical retreat, died without answering the question. Stalin's answer was, in effect, that Lenin had been mistaken, and that it was possible to build socialism, to industrialize even backward peasant Russia, without the European revolution, without aid from Europe.

It was this answer which committed Stalin to a new revolution that completed, and in some ways dwarfed, the revolution made by Lenin. Stalin was an empiricist. He stumbled on "socialism in one country" not by any process of theoretical excogitation, but by a brilliant intuition: he discovered that this was what the country wanted. But the industrialization of Russia without foreign aid, which was what "socialism in one country" meant, was a gigantic undertaking: it required both that the peasant should be more efficient (the breakup of the old estates had reduced still further the already low productivity of Russian agriculture) and that he should be willing to reduce his current consumption (slightly increased since the revolution had made him his own master) for the sake of capital investment in industry. In the middle twenties Stalin the empiricist had no idea how this gigantic task was to be tackled, much less achieved. But once more he allowed the policy to emerge in the hard school of necessity. His own contribution to collectivization was the courage, determination and ruthlessness with which the policy was carried out and without which it could not have succeeded.

What is more often forgotten is the conformity of this revolution to a long established Western pattern. Collectivization in the USSR was the belated counterpart of the enclosures period in English history: that too was a period of ruthless enterprise which showed little tenderness for the individual obstacle to progress. (Britain and Russia were the only great countries which, for different reasons, industrialized without foreign capital and were therefore exposed to the full growing pains of industrialization.) The issue of industrialization now confronts the small countries of Eastern Europe in their turn. Between the two wars the Western nations were agreed in principle that industrialization was the only way out of a tangle of intractable problems for Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Poland; but, while everyone paid lip service to the principle, no practical way could be found within the limits of the existing economic system. A solution under the Russian aegis on the lines laid down by the Russian Revolution is the biggest headache faced by the peoples and leaders of Eastern Europe.

It is the real merit of Deutscher's outstanding biography that he has depreciated neither the magnitude of Stalin's work and place in history nor the heavy cost at which they have been achieved. Unlike Hitler, who made nothing but a "sterile counter-revolution," Stalin has been "the leader and exploiter of a tragic, self-contradictory but creative revolution." And, since every true revolution transcends frontiers, Stalin's significance is international. The national peculiarity of Russia's revolution and industrialization was that they occurred in a country almost untouched by the "industrial revolution" of laissez-faire capitalism. Its international significance is that it has delivered the *coup de grâce* to a social and economic order that was already crumbling all over Europe. Thus the challenge which faces the Western world is one not only, and perhaps not mainly, of Russia's national power, but of international social and economic revolution.

Deutscher's biography contains no snap answers to the questions of the hour. It should, however, serve a double purpose. It provides for any intelligent reader an extraordinarily objective and absorbing account of the most complex political personality of the contemporary world; and it offers to the student of politics a searching analysis of the shifting background of our present discontents.

E. H. Carr began his career in the British Foreign Office in the First World War, and was in the British delegation at the Peace Conference. In 1936 he became professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, and during the Second World War was assistant editor of the London Times. He is now engaged on a History of the USSR of which the first volume is on the press.

The Prize That Was Lost

by Richard Lauterbach

"FACTS ARE UNREAL, of course," Pearl Buck once observed, "or they would not be so constantly used to prove contradictory statements. . . . Facts are just so many bricks, each an entity in itself, but each nothing but a brick until it is fitted to other bricks to make a structure. The shape of that structure, its meaning and its usefulness, depend entirely on the mind behind the hand that picks up the bricks."

ROOSEVELT AND THE RUSSIANS, by Edward R. Stettinius Jr. Edited by Walter Johnson (Doubleday; $4).

In many powerful hands, the facts emerging from the Yalta Conference of 1945 were used to create a widely publicized tableau of Roosevelt, a timid and shattered old man, weakly surrendering to a cunning, inflexible Stalin. In *Roosevelt and the Russians*, another version emerges. "I firmly believe," the author writes, "that when all the evidence is in and when the Conference is seen in its proper perspective Yalta will become a symbol—not of appeasement, but of a wise and courageous attempt by Presiden

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Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to set the world on the road to lasting peace."

The late Edward R. Stettinius was Roosevelt's Secretary of State at the time of Yalta. Whether or not he was a good or bad choice for that position does not need to be argued here, nor does the author attempt to make a case one way or the other in his book. He does, however, make a case for his unswerving loyalty to the principles and to the people he believed in, despite a changed climate of opinion which now brands Roosevelt an "appeaser" and Alger Hiss a "traitor."

Stettinius had "deep respect for the memory of President Roosevelt and unshaken faith in the rightness of his foreign policy." Describing the experts who traveled with him to the Crimea, he goes out of his way to tip his hat to Hiss:

> Shortly after I became Under Secretary of State—October, 1943—with the approval of the President and Mr. Hull I called in the FBI to conduct a security examination of the State Department. . . . I never heard of any questioning of Mr. Hiss's loyalty from anyone inside or outside of the State Department or from the FBI during my time of service in the Department.
>
> Hiss performed brilliantly throughout the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, the Yalta Conference, the San Francisco Conference, and the first meeting of the United Nations Assembly in London. I always had reason to believe that Hiss acted honorably and patriotically in the performance of his duties at these conferences. . . .

Although it was suggested that he qualify this endorsement of Hiss after the perjury trial, Stettinius refused to do so and even included in the book a full-length picture of himself and Hiss taken at Yalta.

This reveals a good deal about the author's character and about his frame of mind while working on the book. He knew he was a very sick man; he had no desire for further prestige; what he desperately wanted was to clear up some of the ugly distortions, Russian as well as American, that have poisoned public opinion on Yalta.

Contrary to rumor, Stettinius found Roosevelt at his best at Yalta, in full possession of his powers, relaxed, laughing, gibing, bargaining and acting as peacemaker. Contrary to much editorial opinion, Stettinius does not believe that Roosevelt and Churchill "surrendered" anything at Yalta that the Russians could not have taken anyway. His balance sheet of the conference give-and-take, carefully documented, proves that "the Soviet Union made greater concessions at Yalta to the United States and Great Britain than were made to the Soviets." He is convinced that "the real difficulties with the Soviet Union came *after* Yalta when the agreements were not respected." Analyzing possible reasons for Moscow's "failure to honor these agreements," the author cites the abrupt manner in which Lend-Lease was canceled shortly after Roosevelt's death; it may have helped to shake Stalin's confidence in our willingness to continue coöperation in the postwar period. He also ventures a guess that the Politburo overruled Stalin.

Some of Stettinius' facts appear incontrovertible, in any hands. General Eisenhower, the author points out, was wrong when he wrote (*Crusade in Europe*) that the US at Yalta should have insisted upon the Elbe as the boundary line dividing the Western and Eastern occupation areas. "The boundaries," Stettinius states flatly, "were *not* drawn at Yalta." Since there was no official transcript of the major sessions, other facts will continue to be debated.

When the Yalta agreements were first announced they were widely applauded by the press in this country. Henry Luce's *Time* said, "All doubts about the Big Three's ability to coöperate in peace as well as in war seem now to have been swept away." But, three and a half years later, Luce's *Life* called Yalta the "high tide of appeasement." In the interim the winds of opinion had shifted. Also the secret portion of the Yalta talks had been revealed—those relating to Russia's entry into the Pacific war and Anglo-American pledges to support specific Soviets claims in the Far East.

Stettinius marshals facts to demonstrate that the military put pressure on the President to pin down the Teheran commitment from Stalin, that the atom bomb had not yet been tested, that the most expert opinion had feared several years more of high-casualty fighting against the Japanese, and that the Allied high command had believed Russia's entry into the war could save several million American lives.

Even after Roosevelt's death, it was the military who protested against getting tough with the Russians. Stettinius reveals that "at a top-level policy meeting in the White House, just before the San Francisco Conference opened on April 25, President Truman, the military leaders and I discussed the failure of the Soviet Union to abide by the Yalta agreement on the Balkans. At this meeting the United States military representatives pleaded for patience with the Soviet Union because they feared that a crackdown would endanger Russian entry into the Far Eastern war." If too high a price was paid for Moscow's agreement to fight Japan, our Military Intelligence must take the blame. But that does not suit the Roosevelt haters.

Stettinius leaves us a book characterized by great dignity and simplicity. Yet the leading actors in it are so full of color and drama that the volume is nearly always exciting. There are wonderful conversations among the Big Three and dozens of quotable remarks grown even more wondrous with the unfolding of recent history. After a lengthy discussion about adding two amendments to a Yugoslav agreement, Churchill remarked that if Stalin said two words to Tito, the matter would be settled. According to Stettinius, "Stalin replied that Tito was a proud man, and now that he was a popular head of a regime he might resent advice. The Prime Minister answered that he felt that Marshal Stalin could risk this. Stalin observed that he was not afraid to advise Tito."

The author's painstaking report of the word-by-word debate over several aspects of the explosive Polish problem is an invaluable clinical study of diplomacy at work. Three extraordinary politicians wangled and wran-

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gled for days over a phrase—only to have the entire spirit of the agreement ignored later. On this issue Roosevelt, in particular, performed with Machiavellian genius, now playing to Stalin's strength and suggesting magnanimity, now explaining his own domestic political considerations, now getting the most out of his team of experts, and finally, just when a hopeless stalemate loomed, reaching a compromise.

Nothing in the book underlines how far the world has drifted from Yalta so much as an "inspired toast" which Churchill delivered at a banquet on the fifth day of the conference. As Stettinius paraphrases it: "We were all standing on the crest of a hill, he said, with the glories of future possibilities stretching before us. In the modern world, he declared, the function of leadership was to lead the people from the forests into the broad sunlit plains of peace and happiness. This prize, he went on, was nearer our grasp than at any time before in history, and it would be a tragedy for which history would never forgive us if we let this prize slip from our grasp through inertia or carelessness."

Richard Lauterbach was the Time correspondent in Moscow and an editor of the New York Star. He is the author of Danger from the East, Through Russia's Back Door and These Are the Russians.

Natural Selection in Politics

by Joseph Barnes

"SELF-DETERMINATION, like democracy, has fallen on evil days, because we have been content to keep it in the nineteenth-century setting of political rights. We have failed to adapt it to the twentieth-century context of military and economic problems."

This was written in 1942 by Professor E. H. Carr in his *Conditions of Peace*. The book, like the point of view it expressed, has been as strenuously forgotten as it was once praised, possibly because it was published just before the battles of Midway, El Alamein and Stalingrad turned the tide of war and thus sharply reduced the price in new, hard thinking we were prepared to pay for victory. Professor Carr, who was then an editorial writer for the (London) *Times*, argued that "whether we like it or not, we are in the midst of a revolution. Any attempt to ignore it, or to stem it by a restoration of the past, is futile and disastrous." And he argued further that this was a revolution "against the three predominant ideas of the nineteenth century: liberal democracy, national self-determination and *laissez-faire* economics."

RUSSIA AND THE WEST IN IRAN, 1918-1948, by George Lenczowski (The Cornell University Press; $4.50).

AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE FAR EAST, by Pauline Tompkins (Macmillan; $5).

THE U. S. S. R. AND WORLD PEACE, by Andrei Y. Vyshinsky. Edited by Jessica Smith (International Publishers; $1.50).

On all three points, Carr's book is instructive and chastening reading now. (Just as Russian mouths may well pucker on rereading Stalin's wartime speeches.) Of the three points in this broad definition of our contemporary revolution, the one we have tried most consistently to ignore is the need to revise our inherited concept of national self-determination. Postwar Russian diplomacy and the Anglo-American policy of containment have both concentrated on the areas around Russia's periphery—Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. These are precisely the areas where our own (and not the Communist) model of national sovereignty was still on trial, and where Western (not Soviet) scholars, colonial administrators and statesmen were aware—at least in 1942—of some of the revisions needed to make the system work. Yet in this whole area, where more than half the world's population lives, we have done little to revise our nineteenth-century ideas of self-determination and freedom. Israel, the Philippines, India and Indonesia may prove in the long run to be big exceptions to this statement. Even of these, not one has yet solved the modern economic and military problems of sovereignty of which we became so sharply conscious when World War II engulfed politically independent, neutral nations which were also economically small or weak.

Two of the books here under discussion provide detailed studies of American-Russian relations in the Middle East and in the Far East, carrying the story in each case through the Truman Doctrine and the beginnings of the Marshall Plan. Both describe similar processes: an expansion of Russian power and of Communist ideas and an American counter-pressure which also combines national power with an ideology. These forces have been equally jerky and confused in their development; together they have produced the cold war. The stories told in these two books point to Russian defeat in Iran and American defeat in China, but neither author believes his story has reached its end.

One element in the struggle is strikingly missing from both books: the people of the area in which the struggle is taking place. Pauline Tompkins' book is frankly a study of diplomacy, but it is still worth noting how little influence is ascribed in the history of our relations with Russia in the Far East to popular reaction among any of the peoples living there. Undoubtedly, this is to a degree just how things have been; perhaps what is now happening in parts of Asia may show that historians, like diplomats, will have to admit a third element into their balance-of-power formulas, even in a struggle between titans. George Lenczowski's book discusses Iranian internal politics in much greater detail, but he is under no illusions about their relation to the struggle which has been going on for Iran. One-fourth of the Iranian population still lives in a state of tribal nomadism; the ruling class of wealthy landowners, wealthy merchants and higher army officers has remained the one constant factor through all political changes; small wonder that the Iranian government has been "obliged to play the unwilling role of

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a tightrope walker without an appreciative audience."

So what has happened in both areas has been a struggle to establish, and ceaselessly to revise, an uneasy balance of power. Lenczowski is not discouraged by this. His book ends on a note of hope which he bases on the fact that Ernest Bevin has given even "somewhat firmer accents" to the older, over-all British strategic and political concepts in Iran, and on the "emergence of American interest and leadership." Miss Tompkins takes a contrary view: she calls her book an oblique attack on the "essentially spurious and misleading doctrine of balanced power," and she sees no hope for peace as long as we perpetuate the system of sovereign nations. Both authors are convinced that the modern world can offer only short interludes of balance in the struggle for power, and that even the uneasy balances of the nineteenth century which they describe are unlikely to repeat themselves. On the Russian side the instability of any temporary balance springs from the marriage of national Russian power to a revolutionary movement which is committed in theory to embracing the whole world. On the American side, it is clear from both books that few Iranians or other Asiatics expect the economic power of the United States, after growing for a generation like Jack's beanstalk, to start acting like a potted geranium.

The collection of speeches made by Vyshinsky in 1948 and 1949, edited by Jessica Smith, contains—curiously—not a single sentence about Asia, although three of its six chapters are devoted to atomic-energy control, human rights and the veto power. Nor is there much hope to be found in these speeches that Russian diplomacy will soon break out of its own straitjacket (of stupidity, fear, malevolence, or all three) toward any constructive solution of this problem of power rivalry. Miss Tompkins' hope for a steady abrogation of national sovereignty through the United Nations is bluntly dismissed by the Soviet Foreign Minister. He speaks of "an utterly incorrect and fallacious theory that the principle of state sovereignty is a reactionary and allegedly obsolete idea, and that rejection of this principle of state sovereignty is allegedly one of the essential requisites for international coöperation."

At the low point of our military fortunes in the war, men took hope all over the world from a phrase in the Atlantic Charter which pledged all the United Nations to seek a peace "which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want." The peace we have gained gives no man freedom from fear, and there is nothing in any of these accounts of big-power diplomacy which warrants hope that either side will ever achieve it short of the military destruction of the other, or even then. Yet the phrase "freedom from want" still has magic in it. If there was wisdom in 1941 and 1942 in recognizing that the revolution we are living through makes us seek a partly economic solution to the political problem of freedom, it might still be wisdom now.

Evidence of this can be found in all these books, but chiefly in the footnotes. Americans working on public health in Iran have done more for our national interest there, in the long run, than the American oil-company representatives who arrived in Iran some months earlier in 1944 than Sergei I. Kavtaradze, who demanded Soviet oil concessions in northern Iran and lit the fuse of postwar trouble in that country. American reconstruction efforts in Japan, Korea and China have given us most of what claim we have to the friendship of those peoples.

The Marshall Plan did not directly concern Asia, and President Truman's Point Four program is too recent even to be mentioned in any of these books. Yet it is hard to read these detailed accounts of diplomatic rivalry without a sense of its growing unreality compared to a more fundamental competition in terms of equality of opportunity, freedom from poverty, and full employment. For these are the three chief factors in a new kind of rivalry which cuts deeper than the cold war or any diplomatic struggle. They add up to something vaguely spoken of as social justice, which is to the destiny of nations in the twentieth century what political liberty was in the nineteenth century. We have a head start in any competition on these terms. If we throw it away in a traditional diplomatic struggle for an essentially political balance of power, or waste it in a negative effort to contain a set of ideas repugnant to us, it is immaterial what the Russians do in the next generation—we shall have lost.

Joseph Barnes was a correspondent in Moscow for the New York Herald Tribune. He was also Foreign Editor of the Herald Tribune and Editor of the New York Star.

The Yield of the Sickle

by Abram Bergson

THE COLLECTIVIZATION drive which the Soviet government launched in 1929 has been described as the Second Soviet Revolution. In a brief period the government managed to transform agriculture from an economy run by some 20 million private peasant homesteads to one run by a few hundred thousand radically new coöperative farms. The costs in terms of agricultural capital and skills and even human lives were commensurate.

What did the Second Revolution accomplish?

A comprehensive and detailed account is presented in the recent book of Dr. Naum Jasny. A native of Russia and now at the Stanford Food Research Institute, Dr. Jasny has done a prodigious amount of research, mainly in Russian sources. Until there is an adequate opportunity to study the voluminous data, specialists in the field may be inclined to take a provisional view of the findings, particularly because of the magnitude of the author's corrections, based on his independent estimates, for distortions in Soviet agricultural-production data. But the study is clearly the most authoritative

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in its field today, and the picture of Soviet agriculture that emerges will be accepted on this basis. It is in marked contrast to that presented in many Soviet pronouncements.

The government's major economic purpose in collectivizing was to obtain the agricultural surpluses needed for industrialization: to feed the mushrooming cities, to provide the raw materials for industry and to pay for machinery imports. The spectacular gains in industry attest to the fact that this end was in large measure achieved.

The government expected to obtain the surpluses, however, to a great extent from the superior efficiency of the big-scale mechanized collective farms. And the larger production was to be sufficient to provide the basis for a rise in living standards both in the country and in the city. In these respects, collectivization has been less successful. By the outbreak of war, the Russians had managed to do little more than make good the production losses suffered under the collectivization drive. If allowance is made for increased expenses, particularly fuel and depreciation of the new machinery, there was no gain to speak of.

THE SOCIALIZED AGRICULTURE OF THE USSR, by Naum Jasny (The Stanford University Press; $7.50).

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF THE USSR, Edited by S. S. Balzak, V. F. Vasyutin, and Ya. G. Feigin (Macmillan; $10).

Necessarily, then, the surpluses to a great extent had to be obtained, not out of increased production, but at the expense of the peasant. Many peasants, it is true, migrated to the cities, and furthermore the government provided some manufactured consumers' goods in exchange for the needed agricultural supplies. But the amounts of manufactured goods were strictly limited. On balance, so far as income was concerned, the Russian peasant actually was worse off after than before collectivization. Over a decade period, the average cut in real earnings was about 10 percent.

The peasants' consumption of farm products declined correspondingly. At the same time, even in the cities, the government hardly managed to meet consumption requirements. Undoubtedly standards declined here also.

Here are some summary indices on agricultural production:

In billions of rubles, 1926–27 prices

	GROSS PRODUCTION	NET INCOME PRODUCED, AFTER EXPENSES
1927–28	15.5	9.2
1932	12.0	7.0
1937	18.4	10.3
1938	17.4	9.4
1940	17.8	9.7

The decline in 1932 reflects unfavorable weather conditions as well as collectivization losses. On the other hand, 1937 was a bumper year, and the revival partly reflects *this* fact.

Brief reference to Soviet agricultural production statistics may help make clear the dimensions of Dr. Jasny's task and accomplishments. At the same time there are obvious implications on the general question of the reliability of Soviet statistics. The distortions in the agricultural production data arise from various causes, but chiefly from changes in the method of reporting crops. While at one time the Russians used the "barn-yield" basis, referring to the crops actually collected, they subsequently shifted to the "biological-yield" basis, referring to the estimated crops in the field. Since the "biological yield" is inclusive of largely unavoidable harvesting and threshing losses, the change in method necessarily results in an upward statistical bias in the official data. Interestingly, Soviet statistical handbooks invariably are silent on the change in reporting methods, and the facts have to be gleaned from a variety of other sources as well as from indirect evidence. Not surprisingly, even specialists have fallen into the error of taking the data at face value.

While focusing primarily on a quantitative appraisal of the operating results of the collectivized agriculture, Dr. Jasny also considers other aspects, particularly technology and organization. Significantly, the government did not manage until 1938 to make good in mechanized power the losses in animal draft power suffered under collectivization. Needless to say, an increase in *total* power must have counted as an important element in the government's plans.

Readers who are not already acquainted with the general character of the collective-farm system will readily come to understand from Dr. Jasny's account how the government managed to obtain the surpluses it needed despite the shortages in manufactured consumers' goods that could be provided in exchange. While in principle the collective farms are coöperative organizations, an outstanding feature of the system is the all-pervasive government control. The First Commandment of the collective farm is to deliver specified portions of the harvest to the government.

In sum, then, it would seem that up to the war collectivization was less the vehicle of economic progress that the Communists glowingly prophesied than an instrument of control, to bend peasant agriculture to the needs of the workers' state. But this is all history. What about the future? Can the collective farms ever begin to measure up to the Communist predictions? Inevitably, Dr. Jasny is less incisive on the future than on the past. Apparently he is rather pessimistic, and allusions to the inevitable "collapse" of the system with any weakening of the Soviet power might easily be construed to mean that no progressive solution to Soviet agricultural problems is possible within the present framework.

BERNARD GOLDEN

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But the brief discussion is puzzling on this point. One questions whether, in appraising the record to date, Dr. Jasny has given sufficient weight to an aspect which, as he himself makes clear elsewhere, must have been central; namely, the huge collectivization losses. Asssuming that the limited progress to date reflects to a great extent the difficulties of transition rather than inherent features, some optimism may be warranted. Perhaps collectivization, like socialism generally, has not yet been tried in Russia.

Of course, if reference is made to the immediate future rather than to long-term potentialities, account must also be taken of recent events, particularly the heavy war damage in agriculture and in the economy generally. The Russians have not yet fully recovered from this blow.

Messrs. Balzak, Vasyutin and Feigin are Soviet scholars. Their book, originally published in Russian in 1940, has been translated and published here under the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies. In the USSR the volume has been widely used as a university text; in this country it will be of value chiefly as a reference work for students in the Soviet field. The general reader may find it of interest, however, both for the light it sheds on the nature and limitations of present-day Soviet scholarship and as an example of a superior type of source information on the USSR. In view of the subject—Soviet economic geography—the reader probably will be struck by the numerous references to the views of the Soviet leaders, particularly Stalin, and by the vigorous manner in which theoretic issues are debated, *e. g.*, "Trotskyists, foaming at the mouth, argued that a uniform distribution of productive forces was conceivable only on a world scale." In the USSR, however, Stalin is cited as an authority even in the field of statistics. But obviously the book contains a wealth of solid information on the different matters treated, and these are of the sort conventional in Western works in the same field: climate and natural resources, population, and the location of economic activity. The author of the preface to the American edition, John A. Morrison, fears that American readers may be exasperated by the ideological aspects of this volume. Probably they will be exasperated only by the price.

Abram Bergson, an associate professor of Economics at Columbia University, is the author of Structure of Soviet Wages. He was an American delegate to the Reparations Conference in Moscow, 1945.

Russia in Translation

by Ernest J. Simmons

RUSSIAN LITERATURE has ever remained a kind of *Wunderkind* for the West, a brilliant emanation of the nineteenth century to be admired, discussed and dismissed as something incomprehensibly precocious. One unfortunate consequence has been the tendency on the part of many political and social scientists, who set out to square the circle of the Russian enigma, to ignore the wealth of pertinent material that exists for their studies in the vast sweep of the country's literature. For Russian literature did not begin in the nineteenth century; it is about a thousand years old, and its essential continuity was not broken by the events of 1917. The roots of Soviet literature are deeply embedded in the past. And, in a manner unique among nations, Russian literature faithfully mirrors the whole long history of the people's struggles, their habits, customs, manners, their ideological controversies, and all the conscious and subconscious facets of mentality that go to make up the Russian national character. Two years ago W. H. Bruford in Scotland produced an absorbing work, *Chekhov and His Russia* (The Oxford University Press; $4.25), a sociological study, which might serve as a pilot effort in indicating the important evidence that may be obtained by the social scientist from Russian belles lettres.

A good example of a political scientist who brings a wide knowledge of Russian literature to his interpretation of a purely historical subject is Professor Hans von Eckardt, whose *Ivan the Terrible* (Alfred A. Knopf; $5), translated from the German, will be published December 29. Against the background of a richly documented study of sixteenth-century Russian life, the author offers a fresh psychological analysis of the baffling personality of the great Czar.

Professor von Eckardt knows Russian well, whereas the language difficulty often appears as an obstacle to the accessibility of the bulk of Russian literature to the American student. This is true only to a limited extent now, for it is surprising how extensive is the translation of Russian fiction, poetry and drama into English. In the last two years four new anthologies of Russian literature have appeared, two of verse (C. M. Bowra, ed., *A Second Book of Russian Verse*, Macmillan, $1.20; and Avrahm Yarmolinsky, ed., *A Treasury of Russian Verse*, Macmillan, $5), and a huge anthology of Soviet literature (Joshua Kunitz, ed., *Russian Literature Since the Revolution*, Gaer Associates; $6). To these, over the same brief period of time, must be added a whole series of translations of some of the great classics of Russian fiction. The Portable Chekhov appeared in 1948, Pantheon Press has published fresh translations of Gogol's *Dead Souls* and Gorky's *The Artamonov Business*, and in the attractive, inexpensive Rinehart Editions of classics has appeared a new and excellent rendering of Turgenev's *Fathers and Children*. Perhaps the most significant contribution in this respect is the Macmillan reissue of the old 12-volume edition of Constance Garnett's translation, long out of print, of Dostoevsky's works. Some five volumes have already appeared. Of all the great Russian novelists, Dostoevsky's fascination for American readers seems to be the most enduring. Perhaps this fact had something to do with the recent complete publication—for the first time in English—of the two vol-

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umes of the *Diary of a Writer*, translated and annotated by Boris Brasol (Scribner's; 2 vols., boxed, $12.50), an invaluable work for any student of Dostoevsky and of the Russia in which he lived. All of Dostoevsky's writings, with minor exceptions, are now available in English.

Tolstoy's works have not fared so well lately. There appeared last year for the first time in English an interesting treatise, *The Law of Love and the Law of Violence* (Gaer Associates; $3), and the most recent item is *Childhood, Boyhood and Youth*, three works which have been brought together in one volume (Lear; $2.75). *Childhood* was Tolstoy's first published work, and was followed within a few years by its sequels. There is a good deal of Tolstoy's own childhood in these books, but there is also much sheer invention, and they are written, as he said, from the heart rather than from the head. His extraordinary psychological realism is already apparent in these early writings, but what impresses the reader most is his wonderful skill in evoking childhood memories and associations which all of us have forgotten but which, when recalled with feeling, seem infallibly true and altogether charming.

On the whole, our publishers (British firms are more enterprising in this respect) seem to concentrate on reissuing, and often in the old, inept translations, the standard masterpieces of fiction. Some minor classics of the principal authors are rarely rendered into English, and some first-rate pieces of lesser writers have never been translated. As for Soviet literature, it appears to have fallen a victim to the cold war. Vera Panova's *The Train* (Alfred A. Knopf; $3), a Stalin Prize winner, is the only recent Soviet novel to be published, and it received much more attention in England than here. To dismiss present-day Soviet literature as so much dull propaganda is to take refuge in a state of ignorance hardly consistent with the practical necessity nowadays to know everything possible about the Soviet Union. There has always been a marked cleavage between Communist command and artistic performance in the USSR, a measure of unfulfillment which often evades us because we read about the official directives on art in our press and little or nothing of the literature itself. To be sure, since the war the element of party control of literature has grown more and more monolithic, but the cleavage is still there, though not so pronounced—a fact plainly indicated at present by the abundant criticism of their own literature for deviations from the "line." If most of the novels and plays are mere Soviet "tracts for the times," so much the greater is our need to learn from them. But others can rest upon their own achievements as artistic performances: for example, the recent two volumes (*First Joys* and *No Ordinary Summer*) of Konstantin Fedin's projected trilogy may well take their place beside the best novels that have come out of the USSR, such as Sholokhov's *And Quiet Flows the Don* and Alexei Tolstoy's *Road to Calvary*.



BERNARD GOLDEN

A significant by-product of the interest in Russian literature, sustained by a marked increase since the war in courses on the subject in our colleges and universities, is the surprising number of histories of Russian literature and critical studies that have appeared over the last two years. Two works have been devoted to Dostoevsky, another to the poets Gumilyov, Akhmatova and Mandelstam (Leonid I. Strakhovsky, *Craftsmen of the Word*, The Harvard University Press; $3), and at least four books treating the history of Russian literature have been published, one of them, *Soviet Literature Today*, by George Reavey (The Yale University Press; $3.50). The most recent is *A History of Russian Literature*, by D. S. Mirsky (Alfred A. Knopf; $5). The publisher has rendered a valuable service in bringing together in a single volume the two well-known works of Mirsky, long unavailable (*A History of Russian Literature from the Earliest Times to the Death of Dostoevsky* and *Contemporary Russian Literature*). The editing has been very competently done by Professor Francis J. Whitfield, who brings the story up to date at the end in a comprehensive "Postscript." Most interested English and American readers in this generation have learned the strange and exciting story of Russian literature from Mirsky's books. And there has never been a more eloquent and perceptive interpreter of the subject, though there have been more scholarly ones. Mirsky is more than a historian of literature; he is a talented critic whose sense of values is enriched by a wide culture and whose judgments seem always to be based on a new and fresh reading of the material. His crotchets sometimes annoy, such as his insistence on the negative accomplishments of Russian romanticism, or his private war against the importance of social significance in Russian literature. But one always feels in his work the presence of an original and sensitive mind that unerringly senses every degree of talent and genius.

Ernest J. Simmons, author of many books on Slavic literature, is Executive Officer of the Department of Slavic Languages at Columbia University, and professor of Russian Literature at its Russian Institute.

IN PLACE OF PREJUDICE

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION, by Samuel N. Harper and Ronald Thompson (D. Van Nostrand Company; $5.50).

RONALD THOMPSON has substantially revised the first edition of this standard text by the late Professor Harper, American pioneer in the field of Russian studies. Not only has it been brought up to date and expanded, but its tone has been markedly altered, to an extent the senior author might not have regarded as altogether acceptable. Professor Thompson discusses this transformation with candor: "If the experience of the senior author from

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1921 on was that of a critic becoming more friendly, the experience of the junior author in the process of revising this book has been that of a friend becoming more critical until, at last, such revisions of opinion as have been made have been almost always in a conservative direction." Having thus confessed his bias, Thompson thereupon sets an example of disinterested scholarship and honest appraisal that could well serve as a model for the many who admit to no bias.

It is neither an easy nor a graceful book—as its subject is neither easy nor graceful—and it suffers particularly from a lack of everyday examples to illustrate its dense array of political abstractions. Yet, like Julian Towster's admirable *Political Power in the USSR*, it is at once an effective solvent of Western stereotypes about the Soviet System, and an invaluable aid to an understanding of the most enigmatic, as it is the most provocative and significant, political phenomenon of our century. JAMES R. NEWMAN

PART II — CRITICS AND WRITERS

LITERATURE AND THE COMMON READER

by Douglas Bush

EVER SINCE the first bard sang and the first critic grunted, the responsive capacities of audiences have been different, but it is a cliché of our time that cultural disruption has become pathological. The growth of specialized knowledge—and of general literacy—has been accompanied by the disintegration of the cultivated literary public which for so long was, or seems to us to have been, a relatively homogeneous group. There are now, even on the upper levels, publics as numerous as the departments in a college.

The old body of general readers of literature, if not extinct, appears to have dwindled into that segment of the public which is self-consciously highbrow. And even this sophisticated group is divided. Literary scholarship and criticism, though their end is the same, have become separated, and each faith embraces many sects; there is a gulf between, say, the expert in watermarks and the disciple of Marx, between the literary researcher and the psychological diviner. And the notable achievements of the two main groups, the historical scholars and the "new critics," have alike been made possible by neglect of the common reader. If the scholar has written for scholars, the critic has written for critics. The results have illuminated a few and have left the general public indifferent or hostile to both historical research and rarified exegesis. If the hungry sheep look up, they are not fed; and they may have lost their appetite.

The shrinkage of the literary public into professional or semi-professional groups appears to some to be desirable, even ideal, because it means a community of knowledge and taste on a high level, a fit audience for the modern artist and critic. To others the break-up of the larger public seems disastrous, not only for society but for literature and criticism themselves. Until recent years, criticism has generally been addressed to the mass of cultivated readers; but the new criticism, the dominant gospel of the moment, prefers to be unaware of their existence, and indeed of life in general, and conducts its esthetic exercises for the benefit of the elect, sometimes in a jargon compounded of grit and abstractions. Especially in these times, when an ailing culture is being offered all kinds of nostrums, it might be wished that the humanities were more united and more humane. It is surely one function of criticism to keep great literature alive, to enlarge the saving remnant of serious readers—though it is perhaps fatal to echo Arnold, who, we are told, lacked analytical power and was a mere propagandist for literature. On the other hand, we have sunk so low that popular reviewers can label as "academic" or "unreadable" any book about literature which demands of the reader a modicum of knowledge and critical attention.

These remarks, though written before Donald A. Stauffer's book came to hand, lead directly up to it. In a Postscript that might have been a preface, Stauffer refers to the neglect or the deliberate ignoring of moral ideas by historical scholarship and esthetic criticism, and puts the question he has tried to answer, "How did Shakespeare think human life should be led?" Those who have not progressed beyond good and evil may applaud the raising of that prime question and the book it has called forth. As for the common notion that the impersonal dramatist has no positive or ascertainable moral ideas, Stauffer finds reasonable clues in his choice of subject, his shaping of sources, the judgments implicit or stated,

SHAKESPEARE'S WORLD OF IMAGES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS MORAL IDEAS, by Donald A. Stauffer (W. W. Norton; $5).
THE CLASSICAL TRADITION: GREEK AND ROMAN INFLUENCES ON WESTERN LITERATURE, by Gilbert Highet (The Oxford University Press; $6).
JOHN MILTON, ENGLISHMAN, by James Holly Hanford (Crown Publishers; $3.75).
THE ROMANTIC IMAGINATION, by C. M. Bowra (The Harvard University Press; $4.50).
THE IMAGERY OF KEATS AND SHELLEY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, by Richard Harter Fogle (The University of North Carolina Press; $4).
CHAUCER, by G. K. Chesterton (Pellegrini and Cudahy; $3.75).
JANE AUSTEN, by Elizabeth Jenkins (Pellegrini and Cudahy; $4).

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in the outcome of his plots, his ventriloquism when characters speak out of key, his undramatic set speeches, his repetitive ideas, his recurrent images, and his choric or touchstone figures.

Though the book is profitable for the expert, it is addressed to the common reader. Stauffer does not go into Renaissance philosophy or dramatic fashions but sticks to Shakespeare's plays, tracing, with the tact of an accomplished writer, the growth in moral insight and wisdom that they reveal—youthful confidence in man's godlike possibilities, a blighting recognition of evil in Eden, then a larger and more balanced tragic vision of both man's greatness and his weakness, and finally the comparative serenity of the "miraculous" romances. If these phrases suggest the old patterns of Dowden and others, it may be said that some such evolution is unmistakable, and that Stauffer never makes Shakespeare a codifier of morals. He shows the increasing depth and complexity of such "dominating themes" as "integrity, loyalty, patience, love, forgiveness, humility"—themes which perhaps imply a stronger religious strain than Stauffer seems inclined to admit. The fundamental problems that troubled Shakespeare trouble us, and for readers who weary of the dusty answers of scientists and social scientists and would like to follow the greatest of poetic minds in his exploration of man, this book is a refreshing guide.

Shakespeare is a mountain peak in Gilbert Highet's map of the classical tradition in literature. There is a library of books about various aspects of the tradition in the various modern literatures over the past 1,000 years, but no one hitherto has had the learning or the courage to tackle the whole story. In 549 pages (plus 156 of notes) Highet covers prose and poetry, drama and fiction, education and scholarship, in Italy, France, Spain, Germany, England and the United States, from Bœthius and *Beowulf* to Joyce and Eliot, Gide and Sartre. The classical tradition takes in, in some way or other, nearly all the great writers and an army of lesser ones, in our own as well as in earlier times. We follow the highway of Western literature, with occasional glimpses of a museum or a morgue.

Such a survey requires a heroic polymath, but this book, far from being a dull compilation, is urbane, humane, and readable. Of course the expert in this or that bit of the huge subject may now and then cavil at the scale of treatment or at some critical opinions, and the common reader may not relish some patches of cataloguing or the presence of minor figures, but as a whole the book is admirably organized and alive. Highet has an animating faith in the importance of his theme, not merely in the past but for the present and future, and he is always aware of the world we live in. He is


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not a disgruntled classicist blind to modern progress, though he does not share the popular belief that our age is the climax of civilization—an age which, if it cannot write an *Oresteia*, can broadcast it. For an incidental example of contemporary reference, there is the tripartite figure of classical rhetoric that comes down through Lincoln to "one-third of a nation, ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished."

Highet has a sane and active sense of cultural and literary values. He is no less ready to indicate misguided impulses in neo-classicism than to recognize the necessity and vitality of continual reinterpretation—witness the page on the merits as well as the blunders of Pound's "Homage to Propertius." Further, in spite of his encyclopedic aim, his first-hand knowledge of multitudinous works of literature enables him to combine generalities with the suggestive particulars that bring generalities to life. And there is no lack of lively phrases:

"What wise and sacred drunkenness This day overmasters me?" cries Boileau; but he knows perfectly well that he is stone sober, and determined to write a Pindaric ode.

For a German book, *Laocoön* is unusual. It is short, uneven, and brilliant.

Altogether, it would be a pity if both experts and general readers did not welcome a six-dollar library, a work of judicious synthesis and orientation.

The greatest of English classicists has in the last dozen years inspired a whole shelf of critical books, but it is a long time since a good popular biography appeared. James Holly Hanford, whose earlier writings had a main share in inaugurating "the new Milton," has now produced a biographical study—enriched with illustrations—in which he has more elbow-room than in his well-known *Milton Handbook*. Milton's growing conception of himself as a consecrated poet-prophet, his fervent support of the Puritan revolution, the successive shocks of public and personal experience, and the strength of his recovery, all this makes a moving drama, and Hanford presents it with the fullness of knowledge, insight and sobriety that we might expect.

But the biographer is "less interested in evaluating Milton as an artist, a thinker, or a man than he is in explaining the processes of a creative personality," and such an aim both sharpens and limits his critical focus. The young poet and the publicist lend themselves well enough to personal interpretation; it is when the biographer reaches the major poems that his quest seems to involve special hazards. These poems are analyzed mainly as embodiments "of the dissociated elements which composed the extraordinary complex of Milton's personality," as revelations of the urgent and conflicting drives so often frustrated in actual life. So Milton is the rebellious Satan, the passionate lover of Eve, the rational Christ, and so on. In a broad sense, of course, some such thing may be said of any great artist, but Hanford tends to see the three great works as an egocentric poet's hall of mirrors. His view, a partial composite of older views, may be as sound as it is popular, though we might allow Milton more dramatic imagination (and a deeper religious humility) than his critic seems to find. But this is only a desirably provocative part of a good book.

C. M. Bowra's twelve Norton lectures, delivered at Harvard, cover the six great English romantic poets and Poe, the Rossettis, and Swinburne; there are introductory and concluding discourses on the romantic imagination and the romantic achievement. With a wise platform instinct he concentrates, whenever he can, on single works—"Songs of Innocence and Experience," "The Ancient Mariner," "Intimations of Immortality," "Prometheus Unbound," "Ode on a Grecian Urn," "Don Juan," "The House of Life" and "Atalanta in Calydon." While Bowra disclaims scholarly knowledge of his subject, he differs from most scholars in having a critical range that extends from Greek and Latin through Symbolist and Russian poetry, and his survey of romantic poetry benefits from his large perspective. It may be remembered that a lecturer addressing a heterogeneous and changing audience cannot, like a critic writing for specialists, take accepted views for granted, that he is in the main committed to well-rounded presentations of orthodoxy. Here and there in this book more attention to recent criticism might have modified the questions asked and the answers given, but the lecturer has a gift for seizing and ordering essentials—as in the summary formulations with which he begins and ends. Although there are innumerable special studies of these poets and poems, there are not many books in which the general reader will find such clear-cut, sympathetic and discerning expositions of such a body of poetry; and the specialist who disdains popular lectures may find his perceptions quickened.

Richard Harter Fogle's study of two romantic poets' imagery is a more special and academic book, though in these psychological days readers are probably not confounded by such terms as synesthesia and empathy. This is the first elaborate comparative analysis of the imagery of Keats and Shelley and, whereas most people are either Keatsians or Shelleyans (and not often Shelleyans nowadays), Fogle seems able to be both. His book on the whole

Appeal to Father

Help us, Oh help, as to Baker Street we come!
Trouble is something terrible at home!
The snake, at night, slides hissing down the rope;
The aneurism bursts in every hope;
And we have seen Them, seen Them on the ground!—
Mr. Holmes; They were the footprints of a gigantic Hound!

THEODORE SPENCER

From An Acre in the Seed (*The Harvard University Press*).

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supports the traditional view of Keats's concreteness and Shelley's abstractness (and when he combats the notion that Shelley "lacks sensuous force and richness," we may not be convinced by statistics). But he is mainly concerned with detailed critical analysis, and his perceptive discussion of a mass of examples illuminates them and solidifies or refines conventional generalities. Scholars have been disposed to leave close analysis of imagery to the new critics, but Fogle is not unsuccessful in the use of something like their methods—though he is moved by their dislike of Shelley to a final chapter of strenuous defense.

Among the books surveyed here, the distinctly popular ones are Chesterton's *Chaucer* and Miss Elizabeth Jenkins' *Jane Austen*. The former, first published in 1932, is so thoroughly Chestertonian that it remains independent of passing time. It was predestined that the robust lover of the Catholic Middle Ages, the robust hater of modern "progress," should get around to Chaucer, the great medieval English poet whose settled faith left him free to fix his humane and ironic eye upon men and women. Chaucer is in some degree only one more text for Chesterton's credo; one might apply to the whole book an incidental understatement, "Some of these conclusions are inevitably coloured with my own convictions." Some people have been or will be annoyed by his credo, some by his manner, and some by his amateur equipment. But, for the chief things in Chaucer, Chesterton had an equipment, and his modest desire to multiply Chaucerians is furthered not merely by his gusto but by his frequent capacity for real insight.

Jane Austen, first published in England in 1938, deserved an American issue; this edition differs from the first mainly in the omission of a good many insignificant bits, short and long. Miss Jenkins gives, with much aid from the letters, a full, well-informed and lively picture of Jane in her domestic and social milieu, and the picture is mixed with more literary discussion than most popular biographers allow themselves. Her critical approach, if not ambitious, is thoroughly intelligent, and the book makes a sound and spirited introduction to an enchanting entertainer who is more and more recognized as one of the few great artists in English fiction.

Whether it is a hopeful sign or only an accident, most of these books, though they move on levels as varied as their subjects, make more or less appeal to the general reader. They are humane and persuasive invitations to learning, or rather to experience, that can be accepted with pleasure by all whose brows are not impossibly high or low.

Douglas Bush, professor of English at Harvard University, is the author of Paradise Lost in Our Time, English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth Century, and other books.

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New Tendencies in the Novel: Pure Fiction

by Malcolm Cowley

WE HAVE HAD war novels, Occupation novels, soldiers'-return novels and rehabilitation novels laid in mental hospitals. We have had them all in great numbers and they leave us with a question. Apart from the new subject matter imposed by the times, have there been any changes in mood, manner or purpose that would indicate new tendencies in American fiction?

Such tendencies very seldom appear in novels dealing with the last war and its aftermath. So far their authors have been more concerned with the subject matter than with the problem of finding new ways to present it. If there is anything new in fiction as an art, we must look for it elsewhere.

I have lately been reading a group of recent (1947-49) novels and short stories dealing with civilian life and warmly recommended by the book reviewers. The authors include Lionel Trilling (*The Middle of the Journey*), Eudora Welty (*The Golden Apples*), Jean Stafford (*The Mountain Lion*), Saul Bellow (*The Victim*), Truman Capote (*Other Voices, Other Rooms* and *A Tree of Night*), Shirley Jackson (*The Lottery*), Walter Van Tilburg Clark (*The Track of the Cat*) and Mary McCarthy (*The Oasis*). Their books seem to indicate that new tendencies exist, even while being hard to define.

The eight authors differ in age and talent and to some extent in their pictures of what a good novel should be. Capote is Surrealist (or Gothic, to use an older word) and his characters inhabit a world of nightmares. Some of Shirley Jackson's heroines live on the edges of that same world. Eudora Welty, by far the best of these writers if she belongs with them at all, is interested in abstract patterns of conduct; if she were a painter she would be a Cubist rather than a Surrealist. Lionel Trilling is a critic of great integrity who has carried many of his critical habits into his first novel, so that *The Middle of the Journey* reads like an essay by Matthew Arnold, dramatized. Jean Stafford and Saul Bellow are more lyrical than essayistic. Walter Clark (why always the Van Tilburg?) is a photographic realist who is now attempting to be a symbolist also; the mixture isn't always convincing. Mary McCarthy's *The Oasis* is a conversation piece, like a story told amid gasps and chuckles at a cocktail party.

There are qualities that these authors possess in common, notwithstanding their different approaches to the art of fiction. The qualities can best be stated in negative terms. Generally speaking, the eight novelists (and many others like them) are not idealistic or optimistic like the American writers who were popular after 1900. Except for W. V. T. Clark they are not naturalistic; the others are completely untouched by the influence of Dreiser that began to prevail after 1910. They are not experimental in the manner of the early 1920's; at least they avoid eccentricities of spelling, punctuation and story-telling. They are not behavioristic, like the hard-boiled school of writers that appeared about 1930; and they are not socially rebellious like the proletarian writers of the same decade; in fact they have very little to say about American society. Unlike the war nov-

Malcolm Cowley's article is based on the following books, among others: The Middle of the Journey, by Lionel Trilling (Viking; $3); The Golden Apples, by Eudora Welty (Harcourt, Brace; $3); The Mountain Lion, by Jean Stafford (Harcourt, Brace; $2.75); The Victim, by Saul Bellow (Vanguard Press; $3); Other Voices, Other Rooms, by Truman Capote (Random House; $2.75); A Tree of Night, and Other Stories, by Truman Capote (Random House; $2.75); The Lottery, or, The Adventures of James Harris, by Shirley Jackson (Farrar, Straus; $2.75); The Track of the Cat, by Walter Van Tilburg Clark (Random House; $3.50); The Oasis, by Mary McCarthy (Random House; $2).

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elists of recent years, their work is free from the influence of Hemingway, Dos Passos, Wolfe, Steinbeck or James T. Farrell.

Their books are harder to describe in positive terms that would apply to all the authors I have mentioned. Still, one thinks of a few words and phrases that keep recurring in critical articles: "inwardness," "sensitivity," "mythic," "clean prose," "moral responsibility," "the sense of evil." Let us say that the new writers are trying to deal with the moral crises faced by sensitive individuals (usually of the middle classes); that they approach their subjects from inside the minds of their characters, rather than purely in terms of action and conversation; that they are concerned with problems of language; that they study the use of symbolism and allegory; and that among their symbols are persons and animals intended to represent the spirit of evil.

"The black panther that dominates Walter Van Tilburg Clark's new novel"—I am quoting from the jacket—"is an embodiment and evocation of evil. It is a force, elemental and supernatural, that must be hunted and destroyed." It is also something that no blurb writer would confess it to be, a commonplace of the new American fiction. There is another symbolic panther in Jean Stafford's *The Mountain Lion*, although I think it is meant to be more a token of guilty sexual knowledge than of evil as an elemental force. Other recent books have presented their satans as human beings: for example, in *The Middle of the Journey*, we meet the devil disguised as a hired man. In Shirley Jackson's *The Lottery*—not the short story, but the book of the same name—the devil appears in various shapes, but always calls himself James Harris. In *Other Voices, Other Rooms*, there is Cousin Randolph, who becomes the devil when he masquerades as a painted old woman. In Capote's book of stories, *A Tree of Night*, there is a whole collection of devils, including a psychoanalyst, a circus freak, a man named Destronelli whom we never meet, a sexless voice on the telephone and a little girl with silver-white hair hanging down to her waist.

HARRY DIX

One plot involving the devil is used time and again by the new writers. An ordinary person, sometimes a boy but more often a woman, meets with a personification of evil and sinks into a trancelike state in which she is tempted to the brink of insanity. Meanwhile the reader is given to understand that the devil of the story is not quite real, but is chiefly a projection of the evil impulses in the woman's heart. That is Capote's favorite plot—perhaps his only plot—but he hasn't made it his special property, since Shirley Jackson uses it, too, and one finds it in the work of other new writers: for example, in Robert Lowry's best story, "The Terror in the Streets." Half a century ago most American novelists were Emersonians and found it hard to believe in the reality of evil. Later they tried to explain evil as the result of "the system," a term that usually referred to capitalism; men were always good until the system corrupted them. Today fiction is returning to the old religious principle that evil is in the heart.

It may be that this change in American novels reveals or foreshadows a lasting change in the American mind, a movement away from our traditional optimism and our faith in human perfectibility. On the other hand, the preoccupation of writers with innate evil may be merely a feature of the times, connected with a political dis-

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illusionment that is not likely to outlast the cold war. The evidence is still too slight and we shall have to wait a long time before reaching conclusions. There is a smaller point, however, on which the books I have mentioned—and dozens of others like them, published or still in manuscript—would seem to offer convincing testimony. They indicate the presence of a new ambition among American novelists: toward the production of something that might be described as pure fiction.

It is an old saying that all the arts aspire toward the condition of music; in other words, toward a self-contained beauty resulting from the internal relationships of the work itself and depending little or not at all on the imitation of nature. Fiction is by no means the first of the literary arts to move in this direction. Fifty years ago the French Symbolists were trying to create pure poetry, by omitting facts, stories and moral lessons from their verse and by confining themselves to verbal music and imagery. In America today Austin Warren and René Wellek are advocating something that approaches pure criticism; they argue in their jointly written book, *The Theory of Literature*, that criticism should not be historical, biographical, psychological or sociological, but instead should study works of art with a view to revealing their internal relationships. It was inevitable that fiction should be the next art subjected to this process of purification; and the new novelists are, in a sense, merely following a path already laid out for them.

But what *is* pure fiction? the reader is tempted to ask. Hasn't the novel always been a loose form, a sort of literary duffel bag capable of containing a little or a great deal of anything the novelist chose to put into it? Haven't the world's great novels been of many different types—historical, social, biographical, moralistic and lyrical? What is the essence of the novel and how shall we go about the task of producing it in its pure state, like a chemical element?

Obviously the new novelists are working by the same process of elimination that has already been applied to poetry and criticism. They are trying to exclude from their books all unnecessary description, all information that does not bear directly on the characters, all ideas except those expressed by the characters for dramatic effect, and in general all details, however interesting in themselves, that are not essential to the story. Already some of them are making their books as bare and functional as a postwar factory. If their effort is carried to its logical extreme—and certainly they are moving in that direction—they will also eliminate all historical pictures, all reference to current questions and all aspirations toward a better world, so that their books will achieve a sort of timelessness by having no relation with past, present or future. The novels they write will not be histories or sociologies or ideologies or news reports, but novels pure and simple, fiction reduced to its primary function of setting characters in motion and presenting the results as a self-contained pattern.

But life is not pure or simple or confined to a few essential details. Life is anything you please, but always it is sprawling and wasteful and disorganized. Death is the cleanness that follows corruption, the purity of a white bone in the sun. It is interesting to note that, among the more or less pure poets, "bone" very soon became the most popular rhyming word. The search for purity had led them toward


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an image of death; and I rather think that is where it always leads. Pure fiction, if it is ever achieved, will also be lifeless fiction.

The new writers I started out by mentioning are still far enough from that goal so that their books contain a satisfying number of lifelike impurities. They also have a better claim to our attention in that most of them are *writers* in the strict sense of the word; they try hard to observe their professional obligations and they respect the English language. But although their work is generally good and promises to become still better, it sometimes seems to suffer from their theories. The quest for perfection has kept it small, like most things in this world that aspire toward faultlessness.

It doesn't take risks. All these writers except the polynomial Mr. Clark have a highly developed critical sense, which threatens to become a fear of what their critics might say; and the result is that they hesitate to deal with big themes or even to write the powerful scenes that are demanded by the pattern of their own narratives. Most of their books have little to say about the political and moral dilemmas of our time—*The Middle of the Journey* is the only real exception—and therefore the characters seem to be curiously withdrawn from contemporary life.

Mary McCarthy's short novel, *The Oasis*, might serve as a fable and warning for all these writers, including herself. It deals with a group of fifty intellectuals who buy a summer hotel on a New England mountain top and retire there to form a coöperative community that is intended to preserve the highest concepts of morality, as if in a deep freeze. And what do the colonists do to preserve those concepts while the world they abandoned is drifting into another war? They argue about whether a businessman should be expelled from their community, they argue about how to save Europeans from the Russian police (finally deciding to write a pamphlet about it) and, after repelling a group of strawberry pickers who had tres[illegible]on their land, they argue about whether they were right to do so. In this last and greatest argument the colony goes to pieces. The book is witty, though not quotably so, and wonderfully perceptive of small things. Because it touches on great themes also, like the isolation of the intellectuals, the founding of a utopian community and the coming of a third world war, the story itself becomes tiny and finally tiresome, while the people in it are reduced to finely carved miniatures, like cameos on the face of Stone Mountain.

TROLLOPE IN OUR BOSOM

DOMESTIC MANNERS OF THE AMERICANS, by Mrs. Frances Trollope. Edited and with an introduction by Donald Smalley (A. A. Knopf; $5).

IT IS LITTLE SHORT of astonishing that American travel notes, written 120 years ago by a prejudiced, ignorant, provincial, gullible, humorless English gentlewoman fallen upon impoverishment, should have more than curiosity value today. The fact is that Mrs. Trollope's account of us in the years of Jackson's Administration is a rollicking adventure, deliciously funny, often admirably vivid, and offering one insight after another into the temper and customs of the young republic.

Mrs. Trollope heartily disliked us, thought us intolerably spoiled and undertook herself to ply the rod. She detested our republicanism, deplored our religious anarchy, was disgusted by our free use of whisky and still freer use of the spittoon. She found our public conveyances uncomfortable, our domestic servants incorrigible, our preoccupation with money stultifying and the shallowness of our females' education and the meagerness of their bosoms alike regrettable. She admired our thunderstorms, our wild flowers, some of our public buildings and Niagara Falls (from the Canadian shore). When we responded to her chastisement with the boisterous vituperation of a young country feeling its oats, she recoiled in hurt surprise and marveled at how thin-skinned were these apparently uncouth peasants.

Mrs. Trollope, of course, was often

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

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right in her strictures and there is no doubt she did our manners some good ("a Trollope!" was for quite a time the cry of protest against boorish behavior in public places). But it is also evident that she did not always see the most amiable side of her subject, partly because of her own limitations, partly because she was one of the first European victims of the American propensity for kidding. She repeats with innocent horror an anecdote about a man-eating crocodile that wouldn't have fooled a native for a moment; she sets down with meticulous care a conversation between two close-lipped Yankees who obviously knew she was eavesdropping; she was treated again and again to expressions of ruffian philosophy from wayfarers who shrewdly judged their auditor. Mrs. Trollope radiated virtue and was generous to a fault with her cosmopolitan sensibilities; poor woman, she got fearfully jostled for her pains.

But though Mrs. Trollope was not a very amiable person, she was a great personality. And she had the gift of sight, if not of discernment. When she describes a midnight revival meeting deep in the Indiana woods, the family life of an Ohio cottager, the standards of behavior in a Washington theatre or the river scenery on the voyage from New York to Albany, she writes with genius. *Domestic Manners* started its author, rather late in life, on a career of travel-for-publication that brought her fame, power and a handsome income. She profited greatly from the quaint ways of the natives (both here and on the Continent), but, in our case at least, she has made full payment in a kind of entertainment that, to be sure, was not precisely what she had in mind.

Donald Smalley has edited this new edition of *Domestic Manners* with scholarship and relish. He provides a model biographical introduction that explains, among other things, how the mother of Anthony Trollope happened to be disastrously involved in founding a Cincinnati drygoods emporium. He brings together rough notes, excised passages and other odds and ends of Mrs. Trollope's project that add delightfully to an understanding of her methods. His footnotes are unassuming and almost always entertaining in their own right. Great labor went into this definitive edition, but it is masked by great competence. The publishers, finally, have presented the journal in an elegant, enticing volume copiously illustrated by Auguste Jean Jacques Hervieu, the author's slightly ambiguous major-domo, traveling companion, good samaritan and friend.

ROBERT HATCH

THE TALKATIVE ANIMAL

FROM CAVE-PAINTING TO COMIC STRIP, by Lancelot Hogben (The Chanticleer Press; $5).

A CURIOUS CLUTTER of a book which starts with a description of cave paintings by the Aurignacian hunters, concludes with a plea for world government, and in between discusses the evolution of the calendar, sexual practices of Roman, Caledonian and Majorcan women, genetic peculiarities of dogs, growth of the Chinese alphabet, the Rosetta Stone, mathematical notation, manufacture of paper and playing cards, printing, map making, photography, television, Dick Tracy and Soviet-American relations.

All this is by way of demonstrating Hogben's perfectly sensible thesis that man is a talkative even more than a tool-making animal, that communication has been his glory as well as his undoing, and that if he exploited fully the available methods of communication, especially the visual, he could widen and vastly accelerate his education ("Schools," said the seventeenth-century-educated Comenius, "are slaughterhouses of the mind where ten or more years are spent on learning what might be acquired in one . . ."), enhance his physical welfare, and perhaps even learn how to live at peace. Unfortunately, the style is so inflated, and overlaid with paradox and epigram, that it is often hard to know what Hogben is trying to say. The clarity of *Mathematics for the Million* and *Science for the Citizen* is not in these pages, and even the lavish illustrations, selected by Marie Neurath, do not save the book from being, in many respects, a confused and irritating work.

JAMES R. NEWMAN

MUSIC: Operatic Parable

OPERA SINGERS come and go, individual works rise to popularity and then drop from sight when their appeal is exhausted, fashions of presentation change, but opera itself has never succumbed to these changes. In 1949 the American audience for opera, far from shrinking, is larger and more constant than ever before. A recent issue of *Opera News*, the informative publication of the Metropolitan Opera Guild, lists 217 opera-producing organizations in the United States. Except for about a dozen companies, headed by the Metropolitan, these groups (many of them associated with schools and colleges) are seeking a repertory and techniques of staging to align opera with the tastes and interests of the present generation.

High on the list of vital and experimental institutions stands the New York City Opera Company, which has just completed its sixth fall season under Laszlo Halasz, who has directed the company since the beginning. Throughout the eight weeks, attendance has approached capacity and enthusiasm has run high. For the next three weeks the company is appearing in Chicago, with side trips to Milwaukee and St. Louis. If the organization were geared to extensive touring, it could readily find bookings to keep it on the road until spring.

There are two reasons for Halasz's success in building and maintaining a deficit-free, quasi-civic opera company: he appeals to the musical audience by concentrating on the integrity of the musical worker rather than on

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the display of individual voices; and he attracts the theatregoing as well as the musical public by treating opera as a form of drama that deserves as intelligent and persuasive staging as a Broadway play. Halasz also believes that opera should be sung in English in the United States, and is gradually increasing the number of works given in the language.

In the past 25 years a significant change has taken place in the attitude of the opera public. When great, or at least very good, singers were a dime a dozen, the operatic box office subsisted on the devotion of patrons to the voices and personalities of Caruso, Ponselle, Gigli, Rethberg, Jeritza, Matzenauer, Bori, Chaliapin, Galli-Curci, and the rest. The repertory was fashioned to provide such singers with roles that would display their powers flatteringly—"Norma" or "La Vestale" for Ponselle, "Dinorah" or "Lakmé" for Galli-Curci, "Boris Godounov" or "Mefistofele" for Chaliapin, and so on. The varied and flamboyant qualifications of the artists made possible a wide repertory; and the virtuoso basis of selection did not preclude the inclusion of a good many first-class works.

With the decline in the art of singing during the last generation (listen to old phonograph records if you do not realize how tremendous and precipitate that decline has been), operatic managers have been forced to depend more and more upon the merits of the operas themselves. At the same time, the general level of musical appreciation has improved. Twenty years ago you could shoot deer in the house when a Mozart opera or Strauss's "Der Rosenkavalier" was on the boards; today "Don Giovanni" and "The Marriage of Figaro" are favorites, and popular demand forced the New York City Opera to give six performances of its new production of "Rosenkavalier" this fall, instead of the three originally scheduled. Clearly the opera audience has now matured to the point where it buys tickets for good music and good theatre rather than for highly publicized soloists.

Each year Halasz has grown more adventurous. He made "Salome" a smash hit with a young and unknown soprano, Brenda Lewis, in the title role customarily reserved for established singing-actresses like Mary Garden and Ljuba Welitsch. He induced people to attend (though not in comparable numbers) such beautiful but neglected operas as Strauss's "Ariadne auf Naxos" and Tchaikovsky's "Eugen Onegin."

The climax of Halasz's achievement, however, was reached a fortnight ago, in the City Center's first production of Prokofiev's fairy-tale operatic comedy, "The Love for Three Oranges." For 28 years this opera has been a legendary affair. In the 1921-22 season the Chicago Grand Opera Association, under the extravagant management of Mary Garden, transported Prokofiev, the soprano Nina Koshetz, and an entourage of Russians from their homeland to Chicago, to give the world première of the piece, which had been commissioned by the Chicago Opera. The production contributed more than its share to the $1,100,000 deficit Miss Garden ran up in a 10-week season. What was worse, it fell flat with audiences (two in Chicago and one in New York), which found it disagreeably dissonant and wanting in melody. The expensive Boris Anisfeld scenery was put away in the warehouse, where it subsequently burned. Until this fall, nobody again gambled on "The Love for Three Oranges."

Halasz, however, gauged properly the educating effect of time. His listeners took the music of "The Love for Three Oranges" in stride, rather wondering why its genteel dissonances seemed so shocking a generation ago. When Theodore Komisarjevsky fell ill, Vladimir Rosing, one of the best operatic directors in the country, came on from California to produce a merrily fantastic show that combined buffoonery with aristocratic artistry. "The Love for Three Oranges" instantly became the biggest success in the New York City Opera's history.

On November 19, the company gave the Prokofiev opera in a special

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

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CECIL SMITH

MOVIES: Antidote to Glory

It MUST HAVE taken strength of character to maintain the integrity of "Battleground": to resist the romantic conventions of movie (and stage) war drama, to refrain from picking convenient heroes and villains out of the casuals of the front lines, to abstain from the melodramatic coincidences and the personal "stories" that have hitherto given shape to the chaos of war. Credit for this honesty and forbearance belongs to the author, Robert Pirosh, himself a veteran of the engagement he describes; it belongs also to Dore Schary, producer for M-G-M, to director William A. Weilman, and to a cast of actors, including Van Johnson, Ricardo Montalban, John Hodiak, George Murphy, Marshall Thompson and James Whitmore, who dedicated themselves to GI anonymity.

The scene of "Battleground" is Bastogne, the town and the surrounding woodland, at the moment when von Rundstedt, in a final paroxysm, made his break for the sea. It was there, of course, that General McAuliffe became an overnight idol with the single word "Nuts!" but it is typical of the picture that it refrains from reënacting the scene of the general's felicitous retort.

Bastogne was the last crucial engagement of the war in the West, but none of its dramatic glamor is allowed into the picture. For four or five days, the little company of "Battleground" shuffles around in the mud and snow, digging foxholes, standing patrol, tending their sores and wounds and trying to keep out of trouble. They are obliged to shoot a few Germans who get too close, a few of them are killed in return; they wonder if anyone is remembering them and they wait for the fog to lift. Finally it does, and the planes sweep in; Bastogne is relieved and the men walk out, exhausted, filthy, with no very good opinion of themselves but ironically aware that now they are heroes.

"Battleground," which neither glorifies war nor underlines its horror, has the defects of its virtues. Watching it is a little like trying to read a road map with your nose to the sheet. Little bits of narrative spurt up (an attempted seduction, a flight averted, a buddy killed, a leave home frustrated), but they die out almost before they begin.

You learn a good deal about the men themselves, but it is the kind of surface knowledge that soldiers are apt to have of one another: a shrewd estimate of each individual's tolerance for discomfort and fear, a recognition of leadership in crisis, and an exquisitely detailed catalogue of personal mannerisms. There is no pretense, either, that these men are especially interesting; they make their poor jokes, uncover their primitive philosophies and plan together their small and pointless strategies for survival. They are magnificent, but they are not entertaining.

That is the trap that "Battleground" has set for itself. By holding fast to the essence of the soldier's war—its boredom, discomfort and unresolved fear—the picture inevitably falters, repeats and loses its way. For a time its verisimilitude is fascinating, but when its effect wears off the spectacle becomes as flat and featureless as war itself. But whatever its shortcomings as entertainment, "Battleground" is the perfect medicine for war nostalgia, and as such it is freely prescribed.

ROBERT HATCH

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